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This work examines the development of U.S. military airlift from unproven 
curiosity to a transformative system of technologies, tactics and logistical support which 
enabled the United States to engage diplomatic and military scenarios around the world. 
Through an examination of contemporary reports, technological advances and statistical 
analyses of airlift practices it is shown that the period of 1938-1949 witnessed a great 
leap in tactical and technological innovation within the U.S. air transport community. The 
capabilities utilized during air supply missions to China during World War II and the 
Berlin Airlift foreshadowed a transformative capability providing military and diplomatic 
solutions when none previously existed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It is clear to any casual observer that aviation and air warfare are hallmarks of the 
Western warfighting style in the 21st century. Whether one examines the tactics and 
strategy of the 8th Air Force raids during World War II, the air mobility utilized during 
both the Korean and Vietnam wars, or the forward deployment of nuclear bombers and 
air superiority fighters throughout the Cold War and beyond, it is nearly impossible to 
imagine a current or future conflict where various aircraft types are not vitally important 
to Western militaries, particularly the United States. Beyond the fighter and bomber 
combat aircraft first brought to battle, and the air refueling aircraft enabling them to 
operate the world over, a third aircraft type would come to symbolize the tactics behind a 
uniquely American strategic capability: the airlifter. 
Though fighters and bomber aircraft have long captured the headlines and popular 
imaginations, it is a more mundane relative that truly enables the remainder of a global 
military and diplomatic establishment to function. As we now know it, American airlift 
took shape during the decade from 1938 to 1949 as the U.S. military grew to world 
prominence. This work will examine this critical period in military evolution, as well as 
the technological, tactical and strategic leaps made to enable the concept of air mobility – 
airlift – to function as it does. The airlifter helped shape a global American foreign policy 
in much the same way as the great battleships, freighters, and even the railroads of the 
18th and 19th centuries. Even now, alongside its sealift and ground transportation 
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counterparts, U.S. airlift capacity remains a uniquely powerful and capable combination 
of technology and logistical expertise. 
The airlifter provides the tactical means to support diplomatic, humanitarian and 
military strategies around the world. As such, much of modern American military 
strategy is contingent upon air mobility. Modern U.S. airlift capabilities are largely 
defined by large multipurpose aircraft whose designs feature four engines, high payload 
capacity, long range and the ability to operate from either prepared or unprepared 
airfields. These aircraft are part of a global logistics and mobility network wherein 
communications, navigation, weather forecasting and analysis, and a logistical supply 
chain merge into one comprehensive structure.  
Throughout the Cold War and beyond, the United States and its Allies put their 
diplomatic goals to work through military and humanitarian assistance. This assistance 
frequently begins with the arrival of an aircraft carrier or the landing of a four-engine 
aircraft such as the C-5 Galaxy offloading relief supplies, troops, weapons or support 
personnel. What may not immediately strike the casual observer is the degree to which 
this evolution was not necessarily a foregone conclusion, even as late as World War II. 
Despite the many aviation advances prior to 1938, even the great aerial battles of World 
War I did not signal the overall transformation of Western militaries. Technological 
limitations proved central to the limited role aviation would play during the interwar 
period, despite the accepted understanding of the “importance of air power when used in 
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mass.”1 The airplane remained an unproven technology through most of the interwar 
period, despite major advancements in tactics and technology. 
A decade later, what began with several squadrons of war-weary twin engine C-
46 Commando and C-47 Skytrain aircraft would expand into hundreds of massive four-
engine behemoths such as the C-54, C-97 and C-74. The early days of the Lend-Lease 
ferrying operations led to the creation of a dedicated air transport framework later utilized 
to support U.S. and Chinese forces in the Pacific. As the men and machines involved in 
the various airlift operations continued to press for improved tactics and technologies, the 
hard-fought lessons of World War II would assist the newly created United States Air 
Force in its quest to support the besieged inhabitants of a divided Berlin. At the 
conclusion of the Berlin Airlift, both the U.S. Air Force and political officials in 
Washington thoroughly understood the strength of their newfound capability. 
From its origins in the Ferrying Command, airlift tactics matured through the 
airlift operations into China during World War II, culminating with the Berlin Airlift 
from April 1948 to September 1949. Each step was distinct in both scope and capacity, 
but the Berlin Airlift was unique in the way it combined the logistical, organizational and 
technological developments of the previous three decades to usher in the era of a truly 
modern air force. Without precedent, the men and machines undertaking these missions 
developed a logistical and operational structure bit-by-bit, creating a tactical template 
forever etched into the American military psyche. Never again would geographical 
limitations alone restrict the ability of U.S. policymakers to direct influence where and 
                                                           
1 John H. Morrow, Jr.,”The War in the Air,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World 
War, ed. Hew Strachan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 276. 
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when they desired. Indeed, many of the lessons learned over the Himalayas and in the 
unforgiving weather of Germany would stretch far into the future, echoing in the hills of 
Vietnam, the mountain passes of Afghanistan, and the harsh deserts of the Middle East. 
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Chapter 1 
A New Dawn: Airlift Origins in the Interwar Period 
 
 We of the Army Air Forces found ourselves faced with the necessity of creating an 
air transport organization…to extend to the four corners of the globe, delivering military 
aircraft, equipment, personnel, and cargo to near and far places…over air routes of 
which no man had heretofore dreamed.2 
 -General H.H. Arnold 
 
From the time when Wilbur and Orville Wright first took flight from the dunes at 
Kitty Hawk, aviation design and technology has made considerable leaps forward in 
capability. Despite myriad advances, the essential concept of a singular air cargo branch 
of the U.S. military was not an idea born of the frustrations of World War II. Even with 
the radical progress made during the war, the roots of the U.S. air transport elements 
stretched back through the interwar period to World War I. As soldiers toiled away in the 
trenches of the Western Front, the first military aviators took their battles to the sky. 
Popularized by such names as Eddie Rickenbacker and Manfred von Richtofen, the great 
air battles of World War I proved the military significance of heavier-than-air craft. As 
technologies were pushed to the limit, a new generation of military leaders came to 
understand the promising capabilities of aviation. A few years later, several key figures 
(including Carl Spaatz, Ira Eaker and Henry H. “Hap” Arnold) took part in major Air 
Corps operations throughout 1924-1925 exploring the use and effectiveness of air 
                                                           
2 General H.H. “Hap” Arnold as quoted in the Foreword of Oliver La Farge’s seminal work on air 
transport during World War II The Eagle in the Egg. 
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transport. The “essential” nature of the airplane to future military maneuvers was firmly 
impressed on the young officers.3 
 Yet the armistice of 1918 proved the end of more than the battles of war-torn 
Europe. Over the ensuing months and years, as a wave of demobilization and 
demilitarization swept across the U.S. Department of War, few imagined the ways 
aviation and other technological breakthroughs would alter the fundamental natures of 
both civil and military establishments. The end of the war saw the Air Service drastically 
reduce the overall numbers of postwar planes, returning approximately 2,000 airplanes 
and 1,000 engines from Europe. Of the nearly 6 million men in uniform by November 11, 
1918, nearly 190,000 were members of the Air Service.4  
One of these men, frustrated by a lack of wartime flying exploits and unsure of his 
future place in America’s air arm, was Henry H. “Hap” Arnold. The future commander of 
Allied Air Forces during World War II, Arnold’s early aviation career seemed destined 
for mediocrity. Rather than engaging in high flying exploits, Arnold instead found 
himself in Washington, DC “discharging officers and mustering out airmen.”5 In spite of 
this, the war years taught Arnold the value of technological advances such as “oxygen 
masks with communications devices all in one, air-to-ground radio communication sets, 
automatic cameras, armored pilot seats…and improved aeronautical medical research 
                                                           
3 Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), 9. 
4 Mauer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army 1919-1939 (Washington DC: Office of Air Force 
History, 1987), 3. 
5 Bill Yenne, Hap Arnold: The General Who Invented the U.S. Air Force (New York: Regnery, 2013), 
37-38. 
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equipment.”6 Within the next few years, Arnold and other aviators such as Ira Eaker and 
Carl Spaatz, both destined for future greatness in World War II and beyond, found 
themselves in a battle over scarce resources and fleeting public attention. Throughout the 
immediate postwar period, aviation frequently took on the quality of a technological 
sideshow, wowing audiences with death-defying feats, exhibitions of cross-country aerial 
navigation, and (rather comically) racing carrier pigeons.7 
 After 1920 the U.S. defense establishment began devoting more money and 
resources to the fledgling Air Service. As General Billy Mitchell fought for the 
supremacy of aerial forces above all others, and men like Arnold and Claire Chennault 
pushed the development of bombardment and pursuit aircraft, it became clear to a select 
few that a new breed of aircraft would be necessary. Specifically designed for the 
purpose of moving large, unwieldy cargoes, soldiers, wounded troops or civilians, 
foodstuffs, as well as any or all items necessary for a military unit to function at peak 
efficiency, transport aircraft were an answer to a question few leaders were asking. 
Despite the high-flying exploits over war-torn Europe, the vast majority of resources 
invested into aviation came from a small cadre of businessmen who looked to aviation 
and air travel as the next great step in cross-country and international travel. The Boeing 
Company, for example, viewed its early successes with passenger air travel as 
foreshadowing of future profits and began development of a series of trimotor aircraft 
                                                           
6 Dik Daso, Architects of American Air Supremacy: General Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von 
Karman (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997), 33. 
7 Yenne, 39. 
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including the Model 80, introduced during the first half of 1928.8 Where some saw the 
speed, convenience, and profits of commercial travel, others viewed the new designs as 
precursors of military modernization. 
 Though the Air Service served dutifully during World War I, its place within the 
postwar military hierarchy was far from certain. When Brigadier General Mason Patrick 
took command of the Air Service in 1921 (a post he had held once before during the 
war), he found it in a state of disorganized confusion.9 The disarray stemmed from many 
different causes, yet ultimately came down to a matter of identity: no one within the 
Army, Air Service or War Department had yet put in place a sound institutional footing 
or provided the doctrinal framework upon which an institution such as the Air Service 
could grow. Over the next several years the debates continued as those within the 
aviation community pressed for continued support. In March 1924 the U.S. government 
began the process of reviewing national air policy under the direction of Representative 
Florian Lampert. The Lampert Committee’s was charged with making a 
sweeping investigation of the United States Army Air Service, the Naval 
Bureau of Aeronautics, the United States contract air mail service, and 
‘any corporations, firms or individuals or agencies having any transactions 
with or being in any manner associated with or controlled or regulated by 
the said air services.’10 
This broad approach allowed the committee to interview 150 key figures over an eleven 
month period, covering such diverse topics as public-private partnerships, maintaining a 
                                                           
8 Peter M. Bowers, Boeing Aircraft Since 1916 3rd ed. (London: Putnam Aeronautical Books, 
1989), 136-137. 
9 Mason M. Patrick The United States in the Air (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 
1928), 89. 
10 Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States 
Air Force 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, 1974), 44. 
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ready “nucleus of aircraft manufacturers,” and the possible creation of an independent 
Air Corps.11 
 In addition to the Lampert committee, several members of the Army and Navy 
pressed President Calvin Coolidge to create “a board to study the best means of 
developing and applying aircraft in national defense.”12 The board, later referred to as the 
Morrow Board, was led by Dwight W. Morrow and began hearings in September 1925. 
Many of the same individuals and arguments were present, and a clear rift within the War 
Department (primarily between the Army and Navy), was made clear once again. Though 
most conceded the utility of aviation, few saw the need for increased expenditures at 
requested levels or the need for an independent Air Service. The board and Congress 
stopped short of recommending a wholly independent air arm of U.S. military, it 
endorsed an expansion of resources. The subsequent Air Corps Act of 1926 changed the 
name of the Air Service, added an assistant secretary of to oversee the Air Corps, and 
instituted a five year program of expansion and procurement.13  
 This did not, however, mark the end of the Air Corps’ period of flux during the 
interwar period. The Air Corps Act authorized an increase to 1,800 “serviceable” aircraft 
by the end of the 5 year expansion plan, though others (including Patrick himself) 
continued to push for a larger number.14 The majority of the aircraft in service were 
dedicated to offensive roles such as pursuit (later fighter), bombardment, reconnaissance, 
                                                           
11 Ibid., 44-45. 
12 Ibid., 46-48. 
13 Ibid., 50-51.  
14 Maurer, 210-211. 
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and even balloon detachments. Air cargo, on the other hand, was largely relegated to a 
limited support status and utilized available planes deemed obsolete for other purposes.  
By the late 1920s and early 1930s, civilian air carriers had made great strides in 
safety and efficiency. Air travel, though still a luxury, was far more commonplace and 
civilian carriers routinely served as air cargo contractors for the U.S. military. As many 
soon saw, though, a defense posture supported by civilian airlines was not the most 
effective means of establishing a solid logistical base. Contrary to the recommendations 
of the panel led by former Secretary of War Newton Baker, there were some within the 
aviation establishment who understood the subtle yet powerful distinctions between 
civilian and military aviation.15 Despite technological and logistical similarities, the needs 
of military and civilian operators were fundamentally different in terms of practical use, 
comfort of cargo and passengers, design rigors, and various other redundant features. 
Major General Benjamin Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps, in a letter to his superiors 
rejected much of the contemporary thinking regarding the use of civilian designs for 
military purposes. Although the letter outlined the necessity of government-sponsored 
designs intended for use as military airlifters, Foulois stated that the debate was similar to 
that between a passenger car and a truck. Whereas the passenger automobile could carry 
a certain amount of freight, “true economy demands the use of a cargo truck for such 
                                                           
15 The “Baker Board,” and many of its contemporaries, were focused on the development of 
aviation throughout the U.S. civilian and military worlds, and would eventually lead to the development of 
an independent air-arm of the U.S. Army. 
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purposes.”16 Foulois urged the continued research and experimentation with air cargo 
transports specifically designed or modified for military purposes. 
During the 1920s the Air Service undertook several small-scale transport 
experiments, such as using a converted De Havilland DH-4 for transporting passengers 
and equipment. Originally designed as a light bomber and artillery spotter, the DH-4 was 
eventually transformed into more than sixty different variants. As no requirements 
existed for the movement of goods and personnel by air, these early measures were 
primarily experimental. By the midpoint of the decade, preliminary plans were in place to 
include air cargo elements as “the Air Corps figured an air force associated with a field 
army of a million men needed a wing of 210 cargo planes, each one capable of carrying 
three thousand pounds.”17 Each aviation section was tied to its corresponding ‘air depot,’ 
with each depot commander commanding a squadron of transport planes for use in 
support roles; serving as the precursor to the Air Service Command squadrons of the late 
1930s and 1940s. Once the surplus DH-4s were decommissioned in 1931, the Air Corps’ 
transport squadrons gained access to C-27s, and the larger Douglas DC-2.18 
 Also during the ensuing decade a gradual escalation in both the size and power of 
aviation engines, as well as the aerodynamic design and the use of metal rather than wood 
and fabric, enabled aircraft manufacturers to develop new and higher-performing aircraft 
for both civilian and military use. One of the primary factors enabling greater funding 
                                                           
16 Maj Gen Benjamin Foulois, chief of the Air Corps, to the adjutant general, War Department, 
letter, subject: “1st Indorsement [sic] Recommendation of Special Committee, Air Corps” November 30, 
1934, reproduced and cited in Miller, Airlift Doctrine, 7-8. 
17 Maurer, 367. 
18 Ibid., 368. 
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and resources to military air transport, and considered by General Foulois as one of three 
“most significant” dates in U.S. airpower history, was a contractual arrangement enabling 
the U.S. Army Air Corps to fly mail routes across the United States.19 However strange it 
may seem today to consider the use of military aircraft for such commercial purposes, at 
the time it was seen as a major political and technological achievement for the fledgling 
Air Corps. With the air mail mission came public interest, experience, and above all, 
increased funding. Even the Postmaster General, hardly an expert in aviation matters, told 
General Foulois the “Air Corps would undoubtedly benefit from carrying the mail. The 
nation and Congress would support the Corps better and see that it secured the best 
equipment to be had and sufficient money for pilots to get as much flying time as 
needed.”20 But beyond increased funding, exposure, and flight experience, the utilization 
of Air Corps resources provided invaluable lessons in the art and science of cross-country 
aerial navigation, night flying, and flight procedures during inclement weather. 
Despite nearly three decades of manned flight, the development of air navigation 
had progressed very little from the very first days on the dunes of Kitty Hawk. Prior to 
the development of more sophisticated instrumentation and navigational devices, aerial 
navigation differed only slightly from its more terrestrial counterparts. Prior to World 
War II, aviation was primarily a fair-weather, daytime affair. Aircraft themselves were 
limited in altitude and range, and many pilots traversed the U.S. by navigating via road 
maps, railroad lines, rivers, and other easily distinguishable landmarks. The majority of 
                                                           
19 Benjamin D. Foulois and Carroll V. Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The 
Memoirs of Major General Benjamin Foulois (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 235. 
20 Maurer, 317. 
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in-cockpit instrumentation on most early aircraft consisted of a series of rudimentary 
gauges monitoring engine performance, but technological advancements meant change 
was coming. As aircraft inevitably became more sophisticated and were tasked with more 
difficult assignments, the engineering division of the Air Service continued with plans for 
additional instrumentation including “driftmeters, compasses, airspeed indicators, 
altimeters, flight indicators, sextants and other instruments” to assist in the development 
of aerial navigation.21 Without a safe and reliable track record, aviation could not thrive 
in an age of decreased government funding. 
None of these technologies was, however, altogether new in aviation circles. 
From the earliest days of manned flight, pilots and engineers imagined ways to more 
practically and accurately navigate in this new dimension of human travel. Early pilots 
used combinations of adapted ground-navigation equipment such as magnetic compasses 
and maps, as well as their own learned knowledge of visible landmarks such as rivers, 
mountains, towns, roads and railroad lines. These methods were of little help, though, 
when flying in adverse weather conditions, unknown territory, over large bodies of water, 
or at night. As early as 1924 a group of aviation enthusiasts from within the U.S. Army 
Air Service began experimenting with radio-navigation systems for aircraft. To use this 
system, a pilot would 
tune in on a radio beacon [and hear] a dot-dash signal (a Morse code ‘A”) 
if he was to the right of the course, a dash-dot (“N”) if to the left, and a 
continues sound if on course… [Due to the complexity of interpreting 
                                                           
21 Maurer, 153. 
14 
 
 
these signals], engineers ran the signals to lights on the instrument board – 
white for on course, green to the right, and red to the left.22 
 
As more mature versions of these technologies found their way into U.S. inventories 
throughout the interwar years, truly effective aerial navigation became a reality.  
Another major development of the interwar period was the design and 
development of a legendary aircraft which would provide a rugged, stable and forgiving 
aerial transport for the pilots and crew. Originally designated the Douglas Sleeper 
Transport (DST), the Douglas DC-3 would become one of the most successful and 
important airframes in aviation history and has “since performed for virtually all nations 
a vast array of duties ranging from news-making feats to unsung routine labours [sic], 
from luxury transcontinental passenger transport to tramp cargo, and from corporate 
flying office to night flying gun battery.”23 From its earliest days the DC-3, and its 
military variant the C-47, distinguished itself by hauling anything, anywhere, anytime. 
Rugged and dependable, the DC-3 program began as a response to design specifications 
by American Airlines. Major General Benjamin Foulois would again reassert his opinion 
that aircraft designed specifically for passenger travel could not carry cargo as efficiently 
as required by the military. Despite originating as a purely civilian design, Douglas 
Aircraft would enter the DC-3 during the bid process for an aircraft that could haul 3,000 
                                                           
22 Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 155-156. 
23 Rene J Francillon McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920: Volume I (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1978), 217. 
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pounds, cruising at 125 mph, with a range of 500 miles, and a landing speed not to 
exceed 60 mph.24 The DC-3 fit the bill nicely. 
The selection of the DC-3 for military use had profound consequences not only 
for Douglas Aircraft, but for the U.S. military and its allies. The selection of a modified 
airliner allowed Donald Douglas and his competitors alike to push the design envelope in 
ways they had not previously considered. It provided for the financial security of a major 
industrial base at a time of limited funding. By selecting the DC-3, and later by 
appropriating the airliners and their design firms into military service, the USAAF began 
a nearly five decade relationship between the DC-3 and militaries around the world.  
A low-wing monoplane powered by various versions of the Wright Cyclone 1820 
radial engine, the DC-3 family of aircraft was produced in many different variants to suit 
the needs of wide assortment of customers. In a general sense, the success of the DC-3/C-
47 rested on several key factors; among these were durability and simplicity. Though 
relatively slow, with limited payload capacity, and lacking significant range, the Skytrain 
proved suitable in every conceivable way. During the early 1930s, the primary thrust for 
aviation advancement came from the airline industry. The airlines wanted new aircraft 
that could transport more passengers, faster, safer, and with greater comfort than previous 
models. The DC-3 proved an immediate success for American Airlines, and a host of 
other companies that were finally able to parlay passenger air travel into a money-making 
venture. 
                                                           
24 Carroll V. Glines and Wendell F. Mosely The Legendary DC-3 (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Co, 1979), 54. 
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The DST program originally stemmed from a desire to expand upon the already 
successful DC-1 and DC-2 aircraft by providing a larger, more streamlined and longer 
range aircraft capable of transcontinental air service with fewer stops between New York 
and San Francisco.25 Though the program originally intended to lean heavily on earlier 
designs for the DC-2, the DST would prove an entirely new airframe that was 2 feet 
wider, 2 ½ feet longer, with rounded sides, a redesigned nose, larger wing and tail 
sections, and a strengthened landing gear system to improve ground stability and 
handling.26 By the end of the decade the DST, with the common nomenclature DC-3, had 
thoroughly overrun any competition. Prior to the start of America’s involvement in 
World War II, nearly 80 percent of the “scheduled airliners” in the country were DC-3s.27  
 U.S. military interest in the DC-3 was almost an afterthought. Having successfully 
utilized the DC-2 in a limited capacity throughout the 1930s, U.S. Army Air Corps 
personnel found much to like in the more capable aircraft, but “funding limitations” 
proved to be more bothersome to the military program than lack of interest.28  As the C-
47, the militarized versions of Donald Douglas’ premier design would revolutionize 
military aviation for decades to come. It was the perfect combination of strength, speed, 
economy, and safety. With the onset of war, the DC-3 would fully establish itself as one 
of the greatest aircraft in history. 
 To best understand the later development of the Hump air operations, as well as 
those in Berlin a few years later, one must first examine the establishment of their 
                                                           
25 Arthur Pearcy, Douglas Propliners: DC-1 to DC-7 (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, 
1995), 56. 
26 Francillon, 219-220.  
27 Pearcy, 69. 
28 Francillon, 269. 
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operational forebears, the Ferrying Command and to a lesser degree, the Air Service 
Command. Without the lessons of this earlier period, and the incalculable first-hand 
benefits bestowed upon the men who would form the backbone of later operations, it is 
unlikely that these future operations could have succeeded. From the outset, the delivery 
of aircraft to forward operating locations was a cornerstone of the U.S. Lend-Lease 
commitment to the Allies via the production and delivery of war supplies. Whether 
fighters, bombers, or air transports, the delivery of aircraft from plants in the United 
States to bases around the world was nothing short of a logistical marvel.  
Created by order of General H. H. “Hap” Arnold, the Air Corps Ferrying 
Command came into existence on May 29, 1941 with the expressed purpose to “move 
aircraft by air from factories to such terminals as may be directed by the Chief of Air 
Corps…[and] maintain such ferrying service as may be required to meet specific 
situations.”29 It was during his time with the Ferrying Command that Major William 
Tunner would gain the knowledge and experience from which the framework of future 
Hump and Berlin Airlift operations would take root. Under the command of Major 
Robert Olds, Major Tunner undertook the reorganization and transformation of U.S. 
airlift resources.30 
 What began in a single room with only two individuals at the helm would 
eventually grow into an organization responsible for delivering tens of thousands of 
                                                           
29 The Adjutant General’s Office, War Department, to the commanding generals, all armies, GHQ 
Air Force Departments and corps areas et al., letter, subject: Constitution of the Air Corps Ferrying 
Command, 5 June 1941, as quoted by Miller, 27. 
30 Robert A. Slayton, Master of the Air: William Tunner and the Success of Military Airlift 
(Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2010), 9. 
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aircraft and crew to forward bases around the world. The development of the Ferrying 
Division held several powerful legacies. For one, it would provide the logistical 
framework necessary for an expansion of American airlift resources, the foremost among 
these being an available pool of experienced transport pilots, as well as an evolution of 
best practices to be adapted for use around the world. Second, it provided a sufficiently 
successful model for political and military leaders to open their minds (and their coffers) 
to a broader air transport system. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it would provide 
the time and place one for a young Air Force officer, William Tunner, to gain the 
knowledge and experience necessary to become the preeminent authority on air 
transportation in the U.S. military, and perhaps the world.  
 From the outset, both Olds and Tunner understood the immense task at hand. The 
Ferrying Division, like the rest of the army’s air arm, was “in a very unsettled state,” 
during the immediate prewar period and required a significant investment in both 
manpower and equipment to maintain intensive operations.31 Rather than “simply” 
ferrying an aircraft from factory to field, an entire support infrastructure was needed to 
support the endeavor. It was, put simply, a “fantastic problem.”32 Tunner and his small 
group of associates began the process of organizing their resources. Of prime importance 
was the establishment of bases, as well as finding a sufficient number of competent pilots 
and crew. The size and scope of the Air Corps during the interwar period was a shadow 
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of its future self, with roughly 1,700 aircraft and 15,000 men.33 Though this number had 
grown by 1941-1942, it was clear that a substantial number of the available pilots and 
crew, as well as the infrastructure, left much to be desired. 
 In Tunner’s own words, the duty of the ferry pilot was not to be a hero, risking his 
life and his airplane for the war’s goal, but simply to “do his job.”34 To this end, one of 
the earliest primary efforts was the initial development of a pilot recruiting, training, and 
classification system. Early in the process, many of the available pilots were recruited 
from the rear-echelon forces in the National Guard and Reserve force, as well as the 
civilian airlines. Many of these pilots, though, did not have the depth of experience 
necessary to operate all aircraft types. As a means of moving forward with the pilot 
training program, and beginning to ferry as many aircraft as possible, Tunner and his men 
devised a pilot classification system. Serving the dual purposes of training and delivery of 
aircraft, the classification system gave lesser-experienced pilots the opportunity to 
increase their overall flight experience, as well as expanding the ranks of flight 
instructors. As such, this on-the-job training enabled pilots to take part in the Command’s 
tasks, while 
at the same time they bettered their flying. Thus those at the bottom of the ladder 
would deliver the simplest forms of aircraft, such as artillery spotting planes and 
primary trainers. As they built up their flying time in these basic types, they 
would also be going to ground school and instrument-flying school, preparing 
themselves for the next step up. Gradually, step by step, they worked their way 
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from short hops in trainers on clear days to delivering the largest aircraft all over 
the world.35 
But this combination of pilot training amidst ferrying operations was only one in a string 
of innovative approaches undertaken by the Ferrying Command’s staff. 
 The Air Service Command, on the other hand, was created prior to the creation of 
the Ferry Command when its predecessor (the 50th Transport Wing of the Air Corps 
Maintenance Command) was organized. Originally established for operations within the 
continental United States, the Air Service Command was tasked with “transporting 
technical Air corps supplies between various air depots and subdepots scattered about the 
country; but it also furnished transport aircraft and pilots for use in training parachute 
troops and airborne infantry.”36 Immediately following the outbreak of war, the Air 
Service Command and Ferrying Command experienced very little overlap and confusion, 
but as wartime demands increased, and the Air Service Command extended beyond the 
boundaries of North America, significant overlaps developed and by “1942 the need 
arose for a clear division of responsibility.”37  
 As the movement of aircraft, men, and materiel escalated around the world, a 
sometimes “frantic” effort unfolded toward the development of new routes and 
airfields.38 Though many simultaneous improvements were undertaken worldwide, the 
developments in the North Atlantic offer valuable insights into most concurrent aviation 
developments. Among the most important with regard to the successes in both the CBI 
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and Berlin were the expansion of new air routes and airfields, and the associated weather 
reporting necessary for safe travels across the North Atlantic. Though not a direct 
corollary to later efforts, the process allowed for an expansion of knowledge and 
experience throughout aviation circles. However straightforward this problem may 
appear from a modern perspective, the development of new transatlantic lanes of 
operation was a major technological feat. And as Oliver La Farge notes in his 
contemporary analysis of the issue, an air route “is as complex, as definite, and as 
tangible as a railway.”39 The significance of this distinction cannot be overstated. The 
establishment of safe and efficient air corridors was vital to any prolonged civil or 
military airlift service. Likewise, without the completion of suitable support 
infrastructure, long distance air transport would not have been possible until the advent of 
aerial refueling several decades later. 
Prior to 1940, transatlantic air travel was extremely limited. Between the two, Pan 
American Airways and Trans World Airways (TWA) retained only 13 four-engine flying 
machines for this purpose – strictly for use during summer months.40 In fact, the entirety 
of the War Department controlled only twenty long-range transports, while the majority 
of available civil transports were shorter range twin engine models.41 As the United 
States moved toward becoming a belligerent nation, the development of air routes for 
delivery of all types of aircraft and supplies to the British Isles (and other forward 
operating bases) proved vital. Although the continued delivery of larger multiengine 
                                                           
39 Oliver La Farge The Eagle in the Egg. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1949), 
142. 
40 Slayton, 7. 
41 Miller, 31. 
22 
 
 
transport and bomber aircraft continued as before, an alternate “stepping stone” approach 
for smaller fighter and liaison aircraft was also needed. If a route were developed farther 
north, utilizing Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland and Iceland, a far greater number of 
aircraft and materiel could be delivered safely and efficiently.42 Throughout the winter of 
1941-1942, with an increasing pace after the attack on Pearl Harbor, construction work 
continued on the various runways, hardstands, hangars and support facilities needed 
along the route.43 The improvement of runways and hardstands was an especially difficult 
matter given the weather and rudimentary conditions. In one instance, the U.S. and 
British contingents utilized a packed snow runway at Goose Bay, leased by the Canadian 
government, but were forced to abandon the structure for newly constructed facilities 
across the airfield as temperatures rose and the existing structures could not absorb the 
heavy punishment of landing freighters. Likewise, at similar locations throughout the 
archipelago of air stations across the North Atlantic, additional modifications began. 
At BLUIE WEST 1 there had been completed by June one steel mat 
runway 5,000 feet long and another was under construction while [BLUIE 
WEST]-8 had one good 5,000-foot gravel and clay landing strip.44 The Reykjavik 
airport in Iceland had three concrete runways, but two of these were capable of 
accommodating only the lighter types of airplanes and the third was less than 
4,700 feet in length. Neither of the two American bases under construction in 
Iceland – Meeks and Patterson fields near Keflavik – were usable during 1942.45 
Throughout the region, few elements challenged the development of new airfields and 
associated support infrastructure more vigorously than the weather. 
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With regard to air travel, a safe and uncomplicated trip starts with decent weather. But 
during the late interwar period, and early into World War II, long range communications 
and weather forecasting were in their infancy. As early as the 1930s, weather forecasting 
and aviation meteorology found significant funding and support from various elements 
within the Air Service. Frequently frustrated by a lack of independent weather data, the 
Air Service of the interwar period continued to push for an independent weather service, 
and “success came in 1937, when the War Department split the meteorological service 
among the branches of the Army. The Signal Corps continued to develop, buy, and 
Figure 1.1 Ferrying and transport routes prior to December 1941  
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/maps/AAF-I-10.jpg (accessed November 8, 2014) 
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distribute equipment.”46 No longer was the Air Corps required to wait its turn for 
accurate and reliable data. The split enabled each section (Field Artillery, Chemical 
Warfare Service, Air Corps and other branches) to run their own weather services “to 
meet their own peculiar needs.”47 But despite these gains, pilots and crew still found 
considerable challenges as forecasting was limited and radio reception along the route 
was “often non-existent.”48 
By 1941-1942, significant progress had been made both by the military and 
civilian airlines in terms of the collection and use of meteorological data. But the 
usefulness of this data required communications between weather stations to a degree that 
had not occurred before. In the North Atlantic specifically, accurate weather forecasting 
was essential as dynamic climatic forces merged “with the southward movement of polar 
air masses from the Arctic and the movement north of warm air from the tropics” 
creating favorable conditions for aircraft icing, thunderstorms, and erratic winds.49 The 
job of tracking and analyzing these weather patterns fell upon the men stationed along a 
series of interdependent weather stations from Maine to Iceland. What began with several 
weather technicians installing associated gear and communications equipment in a small 
tent was eventually comprised of many stations spread across thousands of miles. As new 
bases and support facilities sprang up along the North Atlantic Route, radio 
communication and meteorological teams followed suit.50 The North Atlantic facilities 
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also served the dual purposes of providing communications and navigation stations along 
the route, and served as a basis from which further expansion of air bases and support 
infrastructure could grow. 
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Chapter 2 
Over the Hump: Airlift Matures 
 
This was all new. No other air operation, civilian or military, had ever before 
attempted to keep its fleet in continuous operation all around the clock, in all seasons, 
and in all weathers (sic)…The age of air transportation was born right there on the 
Hump.  
 – General William Tunner 
 
In many ways, World War II served as a stepping stone to the modern era for the 
United States, particularly with regard to military technologies. Both civil and military 
aviation took advantage of countless technological leaps to expand capabilities and gain 
invaluable institutional knowledge and experience. From a logistical and organizational 
perspective, the United States’ entry to the war found its air transport community without 
a clear direction or purpose. Enormous progress was made in both the development and 
utilization of available equipment and infrastructure, but significant challenges remained 
and change was coming. 
Now that the United States was actively involved in combat operations, demands 
on the Ferrying Division were frequently at odds with the more urgent needs of theater 
commanders. Men and aircraft were often diverted by theater commanders for their own 
purposes, without consideration of their original orders. Likewise, due to various internal 
difficulties it “was in no position to expand its own military transport services.”51 The 
men of the Ferrying Command had done a more than commendable job of creating a 
basic aviation infrastructure, but war brought a significant escalation in both tempo and 
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scale. More would need to be done. As the movement of men and materiel increased 
worldwide, the increased need for experienced pilots and crew found much of the 
Ferrying Command lacking. No longer solely delivering aircraft to warring Allies, the 
Ferrying Command was tasked with the delivery of aircraft to active war zones by the 
very crews who would take them to battle. The first step of airlift consolidation, the 
creation of a more unified air transport system under the Air Transport Command, was 
soon to come. 
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. air transport units were primarily 
tasked with “establishing and maintaining air communications with those combat areas in 
which the tactical situation was most critical,” an often vague and misused mission.52 Up 
to this time, the primary purpose and focus of the Ferrying Command was international in 
scope, delivering aircraft and resources to forward locations around the world in support 
of the Lend Lease program. At home, the direct aerial supply needs of the Army were 
handled by the Air Service Command, a military organization whose charge was strictly 
domestic. The U.S. military soon learned a major logistical lesson that shaped all future 
military air transport: the separation of airlift resources and authority reduces the 
efficiency and capability.53 In peacetime, a separation of aerial supply resources was 
overly complicated yet ultimately made possible by a considerably smaller scale of 
operations. By 1942 the redundancies and convoluted command structure were cause for 
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alarm, and a series of meetings was held in March to outline a “temporary expedient to 
overcome the overlap.”54 
 A principle impediment was the separation of aerial supply responsibilities across 
several competing groups. Confusion reigned as a result of the inevitable competition for 
men, resources, and a convoluted blend of mission objectives. Both the Ferrying 
Command and Air Service Command served the transport needs of the U.S. Army 
independently of one another, but how they served and under what conditions created 
systemic confusion. We have discussed the duties and relative effectiveness of the 
Ferrying Command. On the other hand, its airlift counterpart, the Air Service Command, 
acted as a collection of independent domestic air arms linked to specific units around the 
world, serving as a sort of “Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps” handling basic supply 
and maintenance services for its associated Air Force.55 But rather than having a unified 
supply chain, each numbered Air Force employed its own acquisition and supply chain. 
Duplication and redundancy abounded, as well as jealousy and outright infighting. On a 
very basic level, the distinction between the two commands was as simple as domestic 
versus global, but in reality the distinction (and the problems they caused) were more 
organizational than geographic. As La Farge notes, the two cannot be “profitably 
separated”: 
A number of articles are required urgently by various units in various foreign 
theaters. These articles are manufactured at points in the United States far from 
each other. If Air Service Command has the final say on domestic air 
transportation, it will determine which of these requirements shall be met by its 
limited air capacity, as far as delivering the articles to the ports of aerial 
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embarkation is concerned. Its decision as to priority and as to the time and point 
of delivery may not have been co-ordinated (sic) with the foreign transport 
organization.56 
As such, what should be a matter of practical military necessity and logistics is 
compromised by interservice rivalry and political calculation. Complicating matters 
further were several unintended consequences of the new wartime footing, particularly 
the desire of theater commanders to commandeer “available” transport aircraft and 
supplies for use in whichever location it happened to be needed. For example, as aircraft 
and supplies traveled from the United States to bases in Great Britain via North Atlantic 
routes, they 
might traverse the jurisdictional area of as many as five separate theater or base 
commands. In the early months of the war, the theater commanders…frequently 
diverted scheduled transport aircraft and crews operating under the control of the 
Ferrying Command to their own immediate tactical needs.…While such practices 
might have been justified in emergencies, if carried too far they would have led 
inevitably to a complete breakdown of the developing system of strategic air 
supply.57 
As such, the Ferrying Command and the rest of the U.S. aerial transport system was 
destined for transformation. Up to this time, both the Ferrying Command and the Air 
Services Command operated independently of each other, creating “a situation General 
Arnold came to describe as substantial duplication and confusing dual responsibility.”58 
The first of several reorganizations took place in March 1942, and split the 
responsibilities geographically giving the Air Service Command control of the Western 
hemisphere, while the Ferrying Command took the Eastern hemisphere. As one can 
readily imagine, the geographical distinctions meant little to these organizations, as 
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global transport missions frequently started and stopped in different hemispheres. Rather 
than simplifying matters, the separation simply resulted in more “waste, duplication, and 
hard feelings.”59 
 The creation of a unified Air Transport Command (ATC) was the next major step 
in the evolution of American air transport. Per Air Force General Order Number 8 issued 
by General Arnold on June 12, 1942 the Air Transport Command was established to 
streamline the “effective use” of air transport within the U.S. Army Air Forces. In doing 
so, the new command’s responsibilities included the “air transportation of people, 
materiel, and mail for all War Department agencies (except for troop carrier operations); 
and the control, operation, and maintenance of bases on its air routes.60 This centralized 
command structure hampered the ability of theater commanders and others to appropriate 
airlift resources for their own limited needs.61 
Though a new organization, ATC retained much of the existing structural issues 
that plagued its forebears. Geographical distinctions and an unclear organizational 
template were remedied, in theory by Arnold’s memorandum, but much was expected in 
terms of practical application. Though operational control of all aerial transportation was 
key to centralizing control both inside the United States and abroad, perhaps the most 
powerful element of this transformation didn’t concern itself with the aircraft, pilots or 
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crew at all. Without control of the bases and support infrastructure, streamlining the 
process from point of origin to final destination, the ATC could not succeed within its 
given mandate. Prior attempts to restructure the Army’s air transport network resulted in 
pushback.62 The new directives allowed for change, and within a short months ATC 
began to evolve from a combination of heretofore unaligned tactical units to an “agent 
not merely of the AAF but of the whole War Department.”63 With a unified command 
structure, and worldwide control of its air and ground assets, the true power and ability of 
the ATC began to take shape.64 
Both centralized control and economy of scale are vital to the manner in which 
modern U.S. military planners utilized air transport resources the world over. These 
lessons were no foregone conclusion, and would by necessity take “the categorical 
imperatives of war [to remove] the restrictions of financial considerations…[from which] 
a complex of bases, ground equipment, supply, communications, and meteorological 
service has been developed” and continued to expand around the world.65 Part and parcel 
of this technological expansion was the continued development of new aircraft types. As 
previously stated, aircraft of various designations stemmed from the Douglas DC-3. Both 
the C-47 (primarily for bulk cargo) and the C-53 (personnel transport) served as the 
primary platform from 1939 through the end of WWII. 
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With the smashing success of Douglas Aircraft’s DC-2 and DC-3 designs, 
engineers set their sights on higher performing aircraft with the ability to fly higher and 
faster while simultaneously carrying a greater number of paying customers. As early as 
1935 discussions on the development of a four-engine aircraft with “twice the capacity of 
the DC-3 and a range of 2,200 miles” were held between Douglas and its primary 
customer, United Airlines. Work on an initial prototype, originally designated DC-4 
(keeping with custom) but later designated the DC-4E for ‘experimental,’ took shape 
after receiving specifications from United Airlines and financial backing from several 
other large airlines to spread the cost, and the risk. The four engine aircraft would carry 
up to 42 passengers in traditional seating. Breaking from the design standards of the day, 
the prototype employed a tricycle-type landing gear configuration, doing away with the 
more conventional ‘tail-dragger’ look which defined most aircraft to this point, and 
incorporated the first ‘nosewheel’ to be used on such a large aircraft.66 Compared to other 
aircraft of its day, the DC-4E was an engineering marvel.67 Additional technological 
advancements included “power-boosted” controls for easier handling by the flight crew, 
auxiliary power units to provide DC electrical power while on the ground, and cabin 
pressurization.68 In the end, however, the DC-4E was a victim of its own complexity and 
advanced features. With the war still several years off the new aircraft was “far too 
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ambitions, too complex and too large, as well as too costly for U.S. domestic operation 
and current demand.”69 
Though an outgrowth of the DC-4E would become the backbone of both civilian 
and military airlift by the end of World War II, other aircraft types would play key roles 
in supporting U.S. forces around the world during the initial hectic days of World War II. 
Both the United States and its British allies relied heavily upon converted airliners, flying 
boats, and a few bombers adapted for cargo transport prior to World War II, but few of 
these early options were ideal for wartime use. Like the DC-3/C-47 listed above, 
converted B-24 bombers played a valuable role in the early days of World War II airlift, 
but served only in a limited role as a “stopgap” due to several limitations.70 The B-24 
Liberator, known as the C-87 in its cargo configuration, was a four-engine high-wing 
monoplane designed by Consolidated Aircraft as one of the first ‘heavy’ bombers in the 
U.S. inventory. The location of its wings enabled easy loading and offloading, while the 
high power-to-weight ratio allowed it to carry anything that could fit into the fuselage. 
Despite these positive attributes, it was attempting to serve a purpose for which it was not 
intended. Design complications limited the C-87’s usefulness as “its fuselage, bomber-
style, was too small in diameter. The plane was actually capable of lifting more cargo 
than there was room to put on board.”71 Beyond technical considerations, military leaders 
also wrestled with the opportunity cost of utilizing bomber airframes for transport use.72 
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Every aircraft they converted for transport use was one fewer aircraft available to bomb 
Germany or Japan. The C-87 would continue to support AAF personnel around the globe 
throughout the war, but in the end it simply could not provide enough cargo capacity, nor 
were there enough aircraft to make up the difference. 
One of the civilian world’s most prolific long-range transports also proved 
unsuitable for full-time military use, and provided a great example of a superior civilian 
transport unfit for a traditional military application. Upon completion in 1939, the Boeing 
Clipper series of aircraft were the largest production aircraft in “regular airline service” 
anywhere in the world.73 The Clipper flying boats were massive aircraft for their day, 
capable of transporting a maximum of 74 passengers and 10 crew to an effective range of 
approximately 3,500 miles at a cruising speed of 183 mph. Later adaptations included 
more fuel capacity, redesigned passenger accommodations, and new engines with greater 
takeoff power.74 They were one of the few aircraft capable of traversing vast stretches of 
the Pacific Ocean during the halcyon days of prewar transcontinental air travel. Yet for 
all if their groundbreaking capabilities, the Clippers were not designed for heavy military 
use, and were found to be too slow, too underpowered, and too few in number. As 
seaplanes, they were also of limited use for land-based resupply efforts. For the duration 
of the war, Boeing Clippers served in various capacities with both the U.S. and British 
navies, while also serving under contract for their original owners, Pan American 
Airways. 
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 Another aircraft pressed into emergency wartime service, and whose lineage 
stretched to the 1930s, was the Boeing Model 307 Stratoliner. Based on the legendary B-
17 Flying Fortress, the preeminent heavy bomber of the 1930s and early 1940s, the 
Model 307 was a civilian-minded outgrowth whose stated goal was high-altitude comfort 
for transcontinental travel. The Stratoliner retained much of the B-17’s structural 
framework (wings, engines, nacelles and control surfaces), while incorporating an 
“entirely new fuselage of greatly enlarged and completely circular cross-section.”75 The 
circular cross-section was vital for aircraft pressurization, one of the most important 
technological advances of the period. By pressurizing the 307 and other subsequent 
passenger airliners, Boeing enabled the crew to fly higher and more comfortably without 
the need for supplemental oxygen.76 Later Stratoliners, designated C-75 once under U.S. 
Army control, included upgraded wings, more powerful engines, and updated control 
surfaces.77 Like the Clipper, the Stratoliner was a fine aircraft for its intended purpose, 
but was severely limited in payload capacity and altitude.78 Fewer than twenty 
Stratoliners of all types were built before production was stopped and the remaining 
aircraft were returned to civilian service. Across the board, technological limitations 
hampered airlift worldwide, and the evolution of aircraft and navigation technologies 
continued throughout the early stages of World War II and beyond. 
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As Europe dissolved into armed conflict, the British government realized that 
only through cooperation with the United States and other Allied nations could it survive 
a protracted battle against the Germans. As such, the most “urgent need” of the United 
Kingdom was war material.79 American planners as well saw the urgent need for the 
growth and development of an enlarged defense establishment, and air transport was seen 
as vital for the war effort. During an initial assessment, army planners “now wanted 
11,802 transports to support the nation’s expanding military organization,” but few of 
these were readily available.80 Over the next five years, various versions of the military 
DC-3 flew thousands of missions, saved countless lives, and were instrumental to the 
Allied victory. But one area, above any other, held the most powerful operational legacy 
for the Berlin Airlift just three short years later. By “flying the Hump” over the 
Himalayas and supplying Chinese forces against the Japanese throughout eastern Asia, 
the U.S. Army Air Corps gained the experience and doctrinal foundation necessary to 
create an operational template for an open-ended airlift mission. What was originally 
viewed by strategic planners as a way to divert Japanese resources and placate a vocal 
and stubborn ally in Chiang Kai-Shek, the Hump operations in China-Burma-India (CBI) 
Theater altogether altered the capabilities, and more importantly, the perception of airlift. 
 While ferrying efforts and the international airlift of military supplies increased, 
U.S. commanders turned their attention toward Europe. Per President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s personal directive, official U.S. policy outlined a “Europe First” strategy 
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focused on the defeat of Germany, while peripherally continuing an ongoing assault 
against Japanese expansion in the Pacific Theater.81 While the U.S. and its Allies initially 
turned away from the Pacific, a crucial ally remained as a bulwark against further 
Japanese expansion: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese army. American 
support of China against the Japanese was longstanding, however limited and unfocused. 
Even prior to December 1941 U.S. support in the form of loans and military equipment 
enabled China to withstand intense Japanese pressure and reinforced the American belief 
that keeping China involved in the fight against Japan served as an “obstacle to Japanese 
expansion.”82 
Despite President Roosevelt’s vocal support of more aid to the Chinese, it soon 
became clear that the “Europe First” global strategy would fundamentally limit the 
allocation of existing airlift resources toward the Pacific. To this end, several non-
military ventures succeeded in lessening the growing pains that would undoubtedly arise. 
Both Pan American Airways and the China National Aviation Company (CNAC) had a 
great deal of experience hauling passengers and cargo throughout the region. Partially 
owned by Pan American Airways, and partially by the Chinese Government, CNAC in 
particular would serve as a de facto air transport arm of the U.S. military during the 
crucial early months of the campaign.83 Prior to direct U.S. intervention, CNAC served as 
the quasi-military link between the U.S. military and Chinese forces in the region and 
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supplemented the early work of the U.S. 10th Air Force which was “activated” on 
February 12, 1942.84 
 In the meantime, despite “definite assurances” by President Roosevelt and others 
within the U.S. administration that the supply route to China would remain open, it soon 
became clear to men like General Lewis Brereton (Commander of the 10th AF) that a 
significant lack of resources and organization plagued the China mission and threatened 
the theater’s viability as a whole.85 Early analysis of the planned airlift to China found 
myriad reasons why the airlift should not succeed. Among these were the lack of 
sufficient numbers of aircraft, competent pilots and crew, a shortage of bases and support 
infrastructure, insufficient weather forecasting, limited topographical information 
regarding the proposed routes and again, the weather. Initial plans divided airlift 
resources across military and the quasi-military CNAC. General Arnold recommended an 
immediate dispatch of 100 aircraft to the region, 75 for the 10th AF and 25 for CNAC, but 
this was not to be.86 
 The India-China airlift started in much the same way as earlier stateside ferrying 
operations. Early control of the mission was given to the newly minted Tenth Air Force 
which was, as of early March 1942, “largely an organization existing on paper.”87 It was 
charged with both flying the supply routes and protecting its means to do so, but “had 
neither the planes nor personnel” to accomplish its goal.88 Organizational conflicts 
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hampered early airlift operations almost from the beginning as few lessons were learned 
from earlier airlift operations. Rather than immediately shifting supplies and logistical 
expertise from domestic ferrying and resupply operations, the Army chose instead to 
create an institution (the Tenth Air Force) from whole cloth, lay out immense 
expectations, and fail to supply it with necessary equipment and manpower. Some early 
limitations were undoubtedly caused by the lack of a coherent organizational structure 
which existed prior to the inception of Air Transport Command, while others were caused 
by the aforementioned ‘Europe First’ strategy and the subsequent failure to adequately 
supply U.S. and CNAC squadrons. This shortcoming was represented both by the number 
of aircraft and support personnel in theater, as well as overall expenditures, because 
the Americans fixed overseas expenditures for the war in Europe over the war in 
Asia at a ratio of twelve-to-one, meaning operations like “Bolero,” the 
preparatory supply of Great Britain in advance of a cross-channel invasion, was 
preferred over the competing demand to resupply the Chinese by air across North 
Burma and India.89  
Likewise, the overall percentage of air transports initially assigned to the China-Burma-
India (CBI) Theater of operations was significantly less than its counterparts, with 43% 
assigned to Europe, 18% to the Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF), and only 15% to CBI.90 
Initial planning for the start of air operations from India picked up from March 
1942 as General Arnold outlined a general set of expectations for the 75 planes expected 
in-theater: roughly 7,500 tons of cargo per month from India to China via the new airway 
system.91 This would not occur, at least not at that early stage. Preliminary plans called 
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for the establishment of three major air bases across India and Burma.92  By early May 
1942 the Japanese push into Burma had cut off the air base at Myitkyina, from which the 
majority of flights were intended to originate, and left “a 550-mile flight path across 
mountains at least 16,000 feet high, through some of the worst weather faced in the 
Second World War.”93 As a result, General Brereton ordered the establishment of several 
sub-commands of the Tenth AF to service the bifurcated supply lines from Burma/India 
into China. Both the Trans-India and Assam-Burma-China Ferry Commands operated 
under one bureaucratic umbrella, but were tasked with moving cargo and personnel 
within different sections of the Hump routes.94 As one can imagine, the complications 
inherent in operating two distinct transport groups from one base (or even a combination 
of bases) led to confusion and redundancy. This redundancy and separation was soon 
found to “run counter to the arguments of experience” found by CBI leaders and crew 
alike.95 
 Both groups, and the joint command they soon formed, would base their early 
operations from an Indian airfield at Dinjan, as no other suitable locations existed. 
Original plans called on the Royal Air Force to provide three airfields, including one at 
Chabua built with “native labor using the most primitive tools and methods,” and 
intended to house roughly 75 transports for both CNAC and the 10th AF.96 These plans 
were scrapped as monsoon rains delayed construction and enlargement of additional 
facilities while severely hampering the quality of life for the initial cadre of pilots, crew, 
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maintenance teams and other administrative personnel.97 As seen months later by the 
Hump’s future commanding officer General Tunner, these early conditions lessened the 
effectiveness of the 10th AF by crushing the morale of its people. As Tunner explained: 
Living conditions were generally bad….Men lived crowded in tents or bamboo 
huts known as bashas, which frequently had dirt floors and insect-ridden thatched 
roofs. This in a land of heat, high humidity, almost constant rain, and mud 
everywhere. Supplies of just about everything were short – plumbing fixtures, 
lumber, water pumps, and wiring….Supplies of proper clothing, scouring powder, 
and fly-screening for the kitchens thwarted all efforts to maintain standards of 
sanitation and living.98 
Despite the inhospitable conditions, flight operations continued for the C-47 aircraft and 
crew as they pushed to assist retreating American, British and Chinese forces in Burma. 
From April to June 1942 the ABC Ferry Command transported thousands of passengers 
and over 900 tons of cargo as the Japanese continued their push into Burma.99 Despite 
these challenges, a functional airlift had begun to take shape (however roughly), and 
supplies continued to make their way into China. In reality, however, these numbers were 
hardly considered suitable. Fundamental flaws existed which would, if left unresolved, 
lead to a collapse of the China resupply efforts and undermine prosecution of the war 
against both Germany and Japan. 
 By July 1942 over one third of the available C-47 aircraft were grounded for lack 
of parts, and the number rose to 19 out of 54 aircraft in September, by which time 
engines destined for P-66 fighter-bombers were diverted for use in C-47s.100 Making 
matters worse, the CBI mission was hampered by unrelenting weather extremes with 
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little ability to forecast local weather changes from day-to-day, let alone region-to-region. 
Across the thousands of miles covered by Hump transports, both pilots and ground crews 
faced winds, rain, heat and humidity without end. Mountain peaks, highland deserts and 
thick jungle canopies served as backdrop for the resupply efforts, and would claim one 
American life for every 340 tons of cargo transported into China.101  
 
 
   
For pilots, the weather was especially treacherous as “low pressure masses 
moving from the west along the main ridges of the Himalayas, highs from the Bay of 
Bengal, and Siberian lows all clashed in furious conflict at the Hump.”102 Weather 
forecasting was extremely limited, and often relied on incomplete or inaccurate data 
supplied by poorly trained operators with lackluster equipment, while formal weather 
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Figure 2.1 U.S. Military Transportation System in China-Burma-India 1942-1943 
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forecasting was not a permanent fixture on Hump operations until 1944.103 Older aircraft 
types, such as the C-47, were designed without advancements such as deicing boots and 
accurate radio navigation equipment, without which the transports relied on equal 
measures of skill and luck to arrive at their destinations. 
Few considerations were as important to the long-term success of the China airlift 
(and the AAF in general) as the recruitment and training of pilots and crew. Prewar aerial 
missions to China and around the globe were largely manned by an influx of experienced 
civilian crews appropriated by the U.S. military. These crews had thousands of hours in 
the cockpit, were experienced navigators, and understood the role proper planning and 
discipline played in air transport. But prewar methods of recruitment and training fell 
frustratingly short during the early days of the war. It soon became clear that the 
established protocols for flight training were “lamentable,” and an overhaul in this 
program would undoubtedly improve the quantity and quality of Army pilots. Existing 
training was flawed, and did not fit the needs of a modern military. The problem was not 
simply the quantity of flight training, but the quality and type as well. Instrument flight 
experience was almost nonexistent, and flying in poor weather conditions was rarely 
attempted. As La Farge describes: 
Flying may be divided into two types, contact and instrument. In pure contact 
flying the flyer depends upon his view of the ground or water beneath him and of 
the horizon to tell him where he is and what position his plane is in. In practice, 
pure contact flying is practically never attempted; if no other instruments, the 
pilot uses his compass to check his direction and his altimeter to give him his 
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altitude….Experienced flyers fly instruments even when they could fly contact. It 
is safer.104 
Experience with instrument flight rules and inclement weather were paramount in CBI, 
where pilots frequently flew several instrument-only flights per day, “seeing the ground 
only at departure and destination.”105 Where previous ferrying and transport operations 
could lean heavily on the commercial airline industry for both pilots and crew, combat 
deliveries by ferry pilots and early airlift missions were left to newly minted aviators 
whose cockpit experience was rudimentary at best. Changes would be made, but it would 
take the influence and experience of the ATC to make them happen. 
Aside from training, the aircraft themselves posed serious challenges for even the 
most experienced pilots. While the bulk of transport missions during the first year were 
flown by the rugged and dependable C-47, a new aircraft entered service that would 
eventually become the backbone of Hump operations. The twin-engine C-46 Commando 
holds a unique place in aviation history as an aircraft whose eventual usefulness and 
durability was overshadowed by a dark early operational history. While the C-47 was a 
“forgiving” aircraft, the C-46’s more complicated and untested design made it difficult to 
handle for inexperienced and inadequately trained pilots, often resulting in an “alarming” 
early accident rate.106 Plain and simple, early models of the C-46 were wrought with 
design flaws and complicated new technologies, resulting in an unstable and often deadly 
aircraft. 
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Curtiss began work on the C-46’s predecessor, the MW-20 passenger airliner, as a 
means of competing with Douglas’ DC-3. The MW-20 design offered a larger passenger 
and cargo capacity with increased range, while still operating on only two engines. 
Several new technologies were also included into the design as a means of improving the 
comfort of both passengers and crew, “adding the latest Sperry autopilot, a pressurized 
cabin, and hydraulic flight controls (replacing the cable, bell-crank, and pulley system of 
moving flight control surfaces).” 107 As a military system, the chief improvement of the 
C-46 was an increased cargo capacity (nearly double the C-47) and greater range without 
a vastly larger four-engine platform.108 Like many aviation firms, Curtiss placed early C-
46 test frames into full-scale production “before the model was ready or the engineers 
trained. The first seventy-five [aircraft] were so unsafe that they had to be sent back to 
the factory for major modifications.”109 Once several major alterations were made at the 
behest of General Arnold himself, the aircraft would play an instrumental role in the 
future success of the Hump operations. But regardless of future successes “it was never a 
completely dependable plane. And in the meantime, C-46’s were killing crews.”110 
Despite these lethal challenges, the C-46 proved to be an invaluable asset by flying 
higher, faster, and with nearly double the cargo capacity. It would take nearly a year 
before many of the C-46’s problems were put to rest, but the aircraft remained difficult to 
fly in the hands of a novice. It would be several more years before larger, more 
dependable, four-engine aircraft were made available to the ATC. Despite these 
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challenges, the Commando eventually overtook the C-47 in CBI operations with an 
impressive 3,144 delivered to the USAAF.111 
 Throughout the first year of CBI supply operations, both the Tenth Air Force and 
CNAC encountered many of the same problems that had plagued earlier air transport 
efforts. Aside from the logistical challenges inherent in operating a large airlift over 
rough terrain, far from existing supply lines, and through some of the worst flying 
weather imaginable, the early days of the Hump operation were hampered by myriad 
technological limitations. A lack of progress in the creation of new navigational 
technologies, weather forecasting, communications and flight instrumentation were 
persistent obstructions to progress. By autumn 1942 it was clear that the combination of 
Tenth AF and CNAC was not succeeding. Previous estimates of 10,000 tons per month to 
China were frustratingly short, as their combined efforts produced only 2,200 tons 
between May and November. Later that year a report was compiled by Frank Sinclair, 
technical advisor for China Defense Supplies, Inc., which roughly detailed the limitations 
witnessed under the 10th AF, among these were the many ways “how not to run an 
airlift.”112 
Broadly defined, the airlift limitations Sinclair described were both functional and 
institutional in nature. The functional limitations were (generally) self-imposed by 
improper planning, misallocation of resources, and a misunderstanding of how to 
efficiently operate an “airline” on such a large scale. The report outlined a lack of spare 
parts (most importantly engines), few available repair and restoration facilities (both for 
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aircraft and engines), lack of an effective training program, poor communications, poor 
living conditions, and a lack of accurate weather forecasting.113 But Sinclair’s report also 
outlined significant institutional challenges which limited the already stifled effectiveness 
of the 10th AF. Primary among these was a strongly “defeatist” attitude of the 
commanding officers and a general lack of respect for the job at hand. Sinclair was 
supported by Clair Chennault (commander of the American Volunteer Group or “Flying 
Tigers”), who 
felt strongly that the failure of the hump was due not only to the technical 
problems of air supply but also to the ‘contempt’ of [Commanding Generals] 
Stilwell and Bissell for this method of supply. Stilwell was an old-line infantry 
officer and his ignorance of the potential of air supply was understandable to 
Chennault but Bissell was a career air force officer and pilot. For him to persist in 
labeling the hump ‘impractical’ was inexplicable and incompetent.114 
The combination of this report and the limited production by the 10th AF led to a 
directive on October 9, 1942, recommending responsibility for the CBI airlift to be given 
to the Air Transport Command.115 
 The first year following ATC’s takeover brought several significant technological 
and doctrinal changes that would shape all future airlift operations. From the outset, the 
aerial resupply of China was a mission wrought with contradictions and hamstrung by the 
inability of political and military leaders to read from the same page. It was a goal 
without a defined plan of actualization. Part and parcel of this issue was the lack of a 
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defined organizational structure from which a more defined operational methodology 
might grow. Regional weather, lack of sufficient transports, recruitment and training of 
suitable pilots and crew, and the establishment of a basing and communications 
infrastructure were vital to any future successes. In fact, much of the basis for ATC’s 
success in the region was structured before its official takeover, as its commanders 
outlined ATC’s mission by stating 
that all aircraft, maintenance facilities, spare parts, and personnel sent out for the 
project would be assigned to ATC and that ATC would have full control of the 
operation under the supervision of General Arnold, "to work in close harmony 
with the theater commander but not to be under his control so far as the conduct 
of the operation is concerned." This offer was based ostensibly on the thesis that 
the 1st Ferrying Group had been handicapped in its primary mission by the 
frequent diversions of its resources to other tasks that seemed more urgent to the 
theater commander.116 
The eventual progression toward more streamlined operations had the added benefit of a 
doctrinal shift for the pilots, crew, and ground support staff already in-theater. Rather 
than simply existing at the end of a far-flung supply chain with little or no thought to 
their place in the larger war effort, ATC’s leaders brought about a change in leadership 
effectively creating a renewed “singleness of purpose.”117 This new purpose, centralizing 
all airlift and ferrying operations under one roof, and the improved operating conditions it 
spawned, would increase both the operational efficiency and general morale of those 
assigned to CBI. 
 As a means of streamlining the Hump airlift, ATC commanders created a new 
wing specifically designated for CBI operations. When General Edward Alexander took 
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command of the ATC’s India-China Wing (ICW), the wing had at its disposal roughly 
seventy-five aircraft (60 C-47s and 12-15 C-87s) disbursed across three British airfields 
in the Assam region of India. Early progress came in fits and starts, and began with 
General Arnold’s initial goals of 4,000 tons per month, a goal not achieved until August 
1943.118 Crucial to the increased productivity was the establishment of radio guidance 
and weather forecasting stations throughout the CBI. Beyond simply improving flight 
safety, navigational aids served the dual purpose of allowing for an expansion of 
operations by enabling flight operations at night or in bad weather. General Alexander’s 
goal of increasing total tonnage over the Hump could only be met if ATC expanded 
operations, and night flying became a reality as the 10th Army Airways Communications 
Service (AACS) Squadron “succeeded in linking the transport airfields with a growing 
radio network,” enabling truly global communications.119 The region also saw increased 
use of radar technologies for use in air traffic control and early-warning aids. Each of 
these technologies helped increase ATC’s efficiency as the unit increased its aircraft 
numbers as well as an ever-deepening pool of new pilots and crew. 
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 The expanded radio communications network, navigation and training aids for the 
ICW were not enough to push them over their assigned goals. As tonnage lagged and 
morale slumped, General Alexander continued to push for more aircraft, larger airfields, 
and an increased operational tempo. Late spring and summer 1943 brought renewed 
efforts to push through 4,000, 5,000, and eventually 10,000 tons per month.120 December 
1943 proved to be a tipping point in the Hump’s history as the more than 12,000 tons of 
cargo delivered to China served as an important political tool for Roosevelt. But some 
within the military establishment saw a “saturation point” coming soon. Likewise, the 
push for more production had an extremely dark correlating factor: more accidents and 
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lost crews. The increased drive for productivity found an increasing number of pilots 
pushing beyond what was considered a ‘healthy’ level of flight hours. When we consider 
the combination of subpar recruitment and training of pilots, a high operational tempo, 
and the physically and emotionally fatiguing nature of Hump flight operations, a pattern 
of psychological exhaustion known as “Humpitis” (among other names) began to 
emerge.121 Airlift crews in CBI routinely flew as many missions and flight hours as 
required in some of the most treacherous flying conditions in the world. Hump crews 
were being pushed to the breaking point, and the result was poor overall performance and 
high accident rates with a general “dose of fatalism thrown in.”122 Something had to 
change. Even General Alexander, himself an honest man with sincere intentions, 
understood the severe limitations of his organization and outlined a detailed evaluation of 
his command.123 Change was needed, and fast, were the airlift to progress any further. 
 A proper analogy for General Alexander’s role as the first commanding officer of 
ICW-ATC would be the trauma nurse. He examined the wounded and failing body of the 
Hump airlift and patched enough holes to stanch the bleeding and provide time for the 
surgeon to arrive. He had the extremely “dirty” end of the job, and by the time he handed 
over control of the Hump, “he turned over a route on which the necessary construction 
was well advanced, many items of radio equipment had been installed, and the crews 
were trained.”124 The patient was stabilized, but more was needed. In operational and 
doctrinal terms, General William Tunner served as the specialist needed to piece together 
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a functional, living organism from the pieces that remained. When General Tunner, a 
veteran and founding father of the Ferrying Corps and Air Transport Command, was first 
approached with the possibility of running the Hump airlift operations he balked at the 
offer. India held no special standing in his mind, and the existing circumstances were 
wanting in every conceivable way. As he saw it, India was “the end of the line.” Rather 
than the next step in an illustrious career, Tunner saw the assignment to CBI as a step-
down. Conventional wisdom saw India as the destination for hard-luck cases and “bad 
boys,” offering up that “anybody who goofed in the Ferrying Division was on the roster 
to go to India.”125 
Aside from the abysmal safety record, poor operating conditions and a general lack of 
purpose, the immediate impact upon General Tunner was the “fantastic confusion” of the 
operation he was inheriting.126 Military structure and discipline were in short supply. One 
of the first and most important decisions Tunner made was the reestablishment of 
military order. He understood that the preeminent issue affecting operational efficiency 
was a complete lack of morale, and it was his duty to “shake up the entire division.”127 
The preexisting ‘end of the line’ mentality of both pilots and crew was confronted by 
major changes to their operating routine. Tunner reestablished ‘norms’ taken for granted 
in any other theater: regular inspections, clean uniforms, shaving and personal hygiene 
requirements, saluting, and even parades.128 Though undoubtedly questioned by staff at 
the time, a return to military normalcy and increased sense of duty seemingly paid 
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dividends for the men under Tunner’s command. Daily staff meetings were required, and 
“every officer was expected to be prepared, even if he had to devote the entire night to 
the preparation.”129 Under the circumstances, Tunner saw the improved morale of 
aircrews as the primary means of both improving the accident rate and increasing tonnage 
over the Hump. The first decision in their favor was a requirement seemingly contrary to 
their stated goals of more flights and tonnage delivered: no longer were aircrews 
permitted to continue flying into abnormally harsh weather conditions.130 Tunner’s 
response to the issue of weather, and its relationship to flight safety, ran counter to all 
previous directives. What Tunner understood, however, from his days operating the 
Ferrying Command was that flight safety was vital to maintaining morale, and morale 
was essential to the increased overall success of the group. He was a realist, and saw that 
no civilian airline 
would permit flight under the conditions we worked under – poor 
communications, practically no radio beacons, planes loaded to the maximum, 
usually bad weather over one end of the route or another and sometimes both, 
icing, extremely high mountains with little chance of clearance if an engine 
conked out, and, of course, the inhospitable terrain below.131 
Whereas previously the aircrew were to push ahead, they were given a clear (and 
appreciated) directive ordering them to turn back should they reach severe weather, 
holding aircraft on the ground and waiting it out. A corollary to this change of operating 
parameters was the total amount of flight time pilots were accruing. Prior to Tunner’s 
arrival, rotation policies were structured around total flight hours: 650 total flight hours 
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equaled rotation back home.132 Tunner altered the rotation schedule for fairly obvious 
reasons; rather than pushing for increased tonnage and mission success, Hump pilots 
were simply flying as much and as often as they could, resulting in fatigue, sickness, 
accidents, and death.133 It was hoped that by altering the policies governing rotation back 
to the U.S., aircrews would not force themselves into unsafe operating conditions simply 
out of a desire to accrue more flight time and a ticket home. From then on, theater 
rotations started with a one-year tour, and would only then be determined by flight hours.  
  “Tonnage” was no longer the overarching goal, as Tunner and his select group of 
subordinates undertook a program of statistical analysis that analyzed every conceivable 
variable so as to eliminate unnecessary risk, expenditure, and (eventually) loss of life.134 
In terms of flight safety, Tunner and his men analyzed every aspect of flight operations. 
From this he created mandatory flight safety committees, which “had to check not only 
the pilot’s activities, but also anyone who had come in contact with the plane for the two 
days prior to [an] accident, from the base’s operations officer to the lowliest mechanic 
who cleaned the windshields.”135 Beyond merely evaluating the root causes of accidents 
in-theater, the ICW began assessing the strengths and weaknesses of existing pilots and 
crew and used increased training and rotation schedules to get the most out of these 
resources. 
 Perhaps the most lasting of Tunner’s changes was the introduction of a Production 
Line Maintenance (PLM) program borrowed from civilian airlines, and from which a 
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greater percentage of aircraft availability would spring. As late as August 1943 roughly 
100 aircraft were grounded on a daily basis for “maintenance” reasons, “long a sore spot 
in India-China operations.”136 Tunner’s team seized upon an invaluable opportunity to 
increase production and efficiency by streamlining the maintenance process, eliminating 
wasted time and resources, thus replacing “a complete mishmash of maintenance 
organizations and policies.”137 Prior to the institution of PLM procedures, aircraft 
maintenance procedures throughout ATC differed from base-to-base, and the resulting 
lack of consistency generated a lack of uniform quality across the fleet. At the heart of 
PLM was the belief that the old system, whereby a crew chief and his crew were 
responsible for the maintenance and production of a single dedicated aircraft, brought an 
unnecessary level of wasted time and energy. Whereas one aircraft’s crew may be 
finished with an inspection or routine maintenance and left with no work to accomplish, 
another aircraft could sit idle for lack of enough trained mechanics to finish the job. This 
created a backlog with uneven results across the board. PLM techniques, on the other 
hand, removed the bond of crew and aircraft while instituting a production-line approach 
where each station specialized in a particular facet of inspection or repair. From station 1 
through station 7, an aircraft could work through the inspection process in under 24 
hours, and after some “experimenting and growing pains,” the system worked superbly. 
Operational ready rates climbed to 85 percent, while inspection downtime dropped 25 
percent.138 
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 As stated previously, the airlift framework of CBI was largely in place by the time 
Tunner arrived as commander. His predecessors had increased tonnage over the Hump 
from 4,600 tons in September 1943 to 23,675 tons in August 1944.139 It was here that 
Tunner’s greatest operational legacy began to take root. What General Alexander had 
experienced the year before confirmed the degree to which efficient global airlift is more 
than the sum of its parts. Where Tunner fundamentally altered the direction of U.S. airlift 
doctrine was a reliance upon increasing safety and efficiency. Rather than simply adding 
more planes, bases, pilots and supplies, the future of U.S. airlift was the marriage of 
technology, materiel, manpower and efficient use of resources. Pieced together, Tunner 
and his men merged the individual assets into a more effective whole. Efficiency was the 
watchword, and many proclaimed the era of “Big Business” had hit the USAAF. 
Tunner’s legacy proved to be the methods he introduced to utilize the power and 
efficiency of the U.S. airlifter force while simultaneously lowering accident rates and 
improving morale. Few could contend that Tunner alone was responsible for the overall 
success of the Hump airlift, but it is without doubt that he utilized available resources to 
their greatest extent possible, and in so doing enabled ATC’s China wing to increase 
production above and beyond earlier estimates. Others may have built the Leviathan, but 
he gave it a purpose and direction. 
Alongside a more capable maintenance program was the enhanced utilization of a 
new breed of aircraft capable of hauling more cargo, more efficiently, and with a greater 
degree of safety than existing aircraft. Even by late 1944 and the spring 1945, aircraft 
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accidents due to pilot error (especially while flying the C-46) were on the rise, and 
Tunner called for increased deliveries of the four-engine C-54. Though it had been in 
design and development throughout World War II, the DC-4/C-54 Skymaster didn’t enter 
true operational status until the final year of the Hump airlift. By 1939-1940, Douglas 
Aircraft began to reevaluate the strengths of the previously designed DC-4E prototype, 
and saw a need “for an aircraft similar in capacity to the experimental DC-4 but of a 
lighter and somewhat simpler structure.”140 Likewise, the Army too saw a need for a 
larger aircraft for transcontinental air transport, and saw the C-54 as a possible fit. Earlier 
attempts to find a replacement for both the C-47 (and later) the C-46 proved unsuitable as 
both the converted bomber C-87 and civilian Stratoliner were limited in carrying capacity 
and overall number. 
By June 1942 an initial passenger version DC-4 was delivered and began 
evaluations by both Pan American airways and the U.S. military (who would designate 
the aircraft C-54). Capable of transporting 9,600 pounds when fueled for a 2,500 mile 
flight, the original Skymaster had a proposed gross weight of 50,000 pounds, nearly 
15,000 pounds less than the experimental DC-4E.141 The aircraft were powered by four 
1,450 hp Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp R-2000 engines, was unpressurized, and could 
carry approximately forty-two passengers. Production of a true cargo-carrying version of 
the DC-4 (C-54A) began in late 1942, with an initial flight in February 1943. The ‘A’ 
model C-54 utilized bucket seats across the exterior walls, and a strengthened floor. It 
also showcased “various minor improvements …and the gross takeoff weight was raised 
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to 68,000 pounds, giving it a payload of 9,000 pounds at extreme range and 10,900 for a 
2,400-mile trip.”142 Overall it was a bigger, stronger, more effective aircraft for the ATC. 
Though it was one of the last military transports originally designed for civilian use, the 
C-54 series aircraft brought U.S. military aviation into the modern era and would serve in 
multiple roles throughout the early decades of the Cold War, specifically making a name 
for itself during the next great showcase for U.S. airlift: the Berlin Blockade and Airlift. 
Between the increased efficiencies created by PLM, and an increased reliance 
upon the larger C-54 aircraft, Tunner saw no limit to the overall amount of tonnage 
delivered. Once the accident rate began to plummet and morale improved, Tunner created 
several competitive challenges to increase production even further. Across the CBI men 
read newspapers such as Hump Express where they could read about their latest 
accomplishments, while also comparing themselves to “competing” wings. Throughout 
the process Tunner “delighted in pitting one unit against another to gain the laurels of the 
top hauler,” a tactic he would utilize to great effect several years later in Berlin.143 
By 1945 the India-China Division comprised nearly 750 aircraft and 4,400 pilots. 
As U.S. forces continued their advance against the Japanese, the newly transitioned 
Twentieth (XX) Bomber Command undertook operations from CBI as part of Operation 
Matterhorn, the use of B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers against the Japanese beginning 
in 1944. The establishment of the XX Bomber Command increased requirements for both 
fuel and munitions, gasoline and oil accounting for over 65% of the net tonnage 
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delivered, with other munitions accounting for 15%.144  On August 1, 1945 Tunner and 
the CBI commanders challenged the division to see how much it could carry. The 
resulting surge delivered 5,327 tons in a single 24-hour period, “exceeding half of 
Roosevelt’s monthly goal of 1943 in a single day.”145 For Tunner, the most 
“heartwarming” result of the day was the accident rate: zero. By the end of the war 
several weeks later, Tunner had proven his methods worked and had completely 
transformed the way many in the U.S. military perceived airlift capabilities. Their actions 
over the Hump, and several years later in Berlin, would forever link airlift to the success 
of future U.S. military operations. As he noted in his memoirs, “the war was over, but 
large scale airlift…was just beginning.”146 
From 1939 to 1945 U.S. military’s air transport components expanded from a 
limited national and continental transport of goods and aircraft to a global air transport 
network in support of U.S. air, sea and ground operations. By the end of the war, Air 
Transport Command and its counterparts had hauled men and machines around the 
world, and transported over 650,000 tons of supplies to China. Though questions remain 
regarding the military necessity of these supplies to the Chinese government, what cannot 
be questioned is the degree to which the support of military and diplomatic missions by 
air was proven possible. When compared to the possible cargo capacity of sealift or 
road/rail transportation, the numbers are somewhat staggering. The same supply total, 
enabled by a massive airlift effort to China, could have been accomplished by 70 Liberty 
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ships or 6,500 American freight cars.147 But as Craven and Cate outlined, airlift at such a 
scale is often a matter of necessity and can be achieved at great cost “even under the most 
unfavorable circumstances, if only the men who controlled the aircraft, the terminals, and 
the needed materiel were willing to pay the price in money and in men.”148 The aircraft 
grew larger and more powerful, and the technologies and procedures for their utilization 
improved with each passing day. The men of CBI proved that such a difficult task was 
surmountable, and the knowledge they gained would be put to use several years later in 
the skies of Berlin. 
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Chapter 3 
Toward a Modern Air Force: Berlin Airlift 
 
The United States Air Force has benefitted enormously from the training this 
operation has afforded…It has convinced us, moreover, that we can fly anything, 
anywhere, anytime, and that the future of military air transport is in big aircraft.  
– General. Hoyt S. Vandenberg 
 
During the final months of World War II the Allied leaders of Great Britain, the 
United States and the Soviet Union met for the final time at Yalta in the Crimea. It was 
here they hoped to settle the postwar European order and bring peace to a continent 
ravaged by war twice since 1914. At the center of this great confluence of power was the 
notion that Germany must be dealt with strongly, effectively, and in a fashion where 
“Nazism and militarism were to be utterly purged and defeated and that Germany’s future 
would lie entirely with the Allied victors.”149 The German nation would be divided 
among the victorious Allies, each managing a portion of the war-torn state, and 
governing under the authority of the four-party Control Council. Early American plans 
had called for a harsh treatment of the German nation, but as occupation eventually 
turned toward rebuilding and growth, it soon became clear that the United States could 
not continually punish the Germans if it wished to foster peace and prosperity. The Soviet 
authorities understood the political value of a weakened Germany and “did little to 
evolve practices or build institutions that promised Germans within their zone...a stake in 
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their success.”150 Over the next several years the Americans and the Soviets began 
creating “spheres of influence,” radiating outward from Berlin, and would begin to probe 
each other’s strengths and weaknesses.151 
Among the victorious nations several important questions set in motion the events 
culminating in the Berlin Airlift, and such as the Cold War itself. In light of the previous 
six years of armed conflict, millions of lives lost, and untold destruction across Europe, 
what was the proper response to Germany by the victorious powers? As tensions between 
the occupational authorities began to rise in 1947 it was soon clear that the once great 
alliance had begun to crumble under the weight of competing geopolitical aspirations and 
socioeconomic systems. The Soviets, continually weary of yet another future war with a 
powerful Germany, wished to bleed the vanquished nation to the bone. Although 
technically bound by a quadripartite agreement, the Soviet controlled sectors of Germany 
during the immediate postwar period were brutally and ruthlessly savaged by a wave of 
Red Army soldiers bent on extracting revenge.152 The physical segregation of the German 
state had been decided by the Allied powers some time earlier, and still even “the briefest 
look at a map shows that these arrangements held not only the seeds but the buds and 
even the blooms of discord and crisis.”153 
Over the following months and years, German citizens found themselves at the 
root of a constant battle of will between conflicting economic and political ideologies. 
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Where there once was hope of a lasting Allied cooperation, there existed a rash of 
continued bureaucratic quibbling and inaction. All the while the citizens of occupied 
western Germany risked starvation if further problems arose. Only through cooperation 
by the Allied Control Council could these issues be resolved, but it was quite clear that 
cooperation was not the order of the day, and for all intents and purposes, “the four zones 
operated in isolation from each other and withered.”154 It was this environment that set 
the stage for the events of the spring of 1948. The Western sectors, growing tired of 
continued stonewalling by their Soviet counterparts began a coordinated plan of 
coordination and cooperation in the hopes that unification would enable their sectors to 
more quickly rebound from the harsh postwar economic environment. Key to the 
economic and political reconstruction of the Western-controlled portions of Germany was 
a unified currency under which a more efficient trade system could be established.155 
As April approached and further talks broke down, the Soviets issued orders on 
March 30, stating that any passengers would be required to show identification papers, 
and that Soviet troops would be required to inspect the cargos of any trains or trucks 
traveling through the Soviet Zone of Occupation into Berlin. Upon hearing this news the 
initial response from General Lucius Clay and others was indignation and anger, and he 
immediately requested permission to resist by force any attempts to interfere with 
American trains, but this request was made in vain. By the next morning his reply had 
been received, and the foundation of the airlift had been laid. Travel by train and truck 
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was at a standstill, and General Clay had decided that since “he could not force the trains 
through the illegal Soviet controls, he would stop using them altogether.”156 The so-called 
“April Crisis” prompted the initial ad hoc stages of the Berlin Airlift, although not even 
the commanders of the lift process had any inkling of what lay ahead. 
The end of the war brought about major changes for the U.S. military. Following 
a pattern established from the early years of the republic, America’s fighting men and 
women returned home in droves and the machines of war were laid to rest. Throughout 
the military, units downsized, men left the service, and the once fierce “Arsenal of 
Democracy” began to fade away into what many hoped would be a long-deserved peace. 
For his part, President Harry Truman pressed the aggressive drawdown of forces as a 
means of reducing overall government expenditures by limiting the defense spending to 
“no more than 20-24 percent of the peacetime budget.”157 The War Department began a 
series of studies as early as 1943 to shape the establishment of a new postwar military 
structure, but entrenched military and political forces within the Army and Navy fought 
against the rapid demobilization as each viewed its own capabilities as indispensable to 
national security. The matter was further complicated by a lack of direction provided by a 
‘defined adversary’ as both Germany and Japan lay in ruins and the Soviet Union was 
still considered an ally, however chilly the relationship had become.158 As the service 
chiefs jockeyed for political favor and their “fair” share of the dwindling economic 
resources, the Army Air Forces were poised to play a major role in any postwar force 
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posture. Without a doubt, the two major World Wars of the previous thirty years showed 
the importance of air superiority, and planners saw the need to retain a significant and 
capable air force. The true question of the period was not if, but how and under whose 
authority the new aerial contingent would operate in the postwar era. 
With an eye toward Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authored a study on 
postwar airlift needs in and around Western Europe, highlighting aviation’s role in the 
rebuilding process. The JCS imagined an abundance of aviation resources, both civilian 
and military, that would operate throughout the zone of occupation. Each zone would 
create much of its own infrastructure, manage aviation related communications and 
weather forecasting, and enable civilian airlines to do the same.159 To this end, an Air 
Safety Center was created to ensure safe and equitable use of German air space among 
the Allies.160 
 As the Army and Navy competed for resources, civilian leaders outlined a need 
for improved service coordination and a streamlined procurement system. World War II 
showed the necessity of an integrated defense establishment combining previously 
independent services under one umbrella organization. On one hand, James Forrestal 
“envisioned a postwar Navy of approximately five hundred thousand sailors, fifty-eight 
thousand officers, and more than one hundred thousand marines.”161 On the other, some 
Army Air Force planners called for a total postwar strength of 105 groups, to be kept at 
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maximum readiness and “ready for immediate combat.”162 Each service viewed itself as 
the most vital component to a robust national defense. One of the earliest and most 
detailed analyses of the postwar AAF framework was constructed by Brig. General Orvil 
A. Anderson, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for operational plans, and foresaw a 
military structure centered on aerial resources, including roughly 7,000 cargo aircraft.163 
Central to U.S. foreign policy of the era was the deployment and utilization of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons arsenal. Both AAF and Navy leaders pushed for central control, each 
offering to lead the nation’s armed forces into the new era of U.S. global leadership. 
In order to consolidate defense priorities, the National Security Act of 1947 
unified the U.S. military, while creating an independent and coequal U.S. Air Force. The 
debate was not complete, however, as both the U.S. Navy and Air Force retained 
significant operational redundancies and continued to press each other and the rest of the 
defense establishment over roles and mission. To quell further dissension, President 
Truman also issued a clarifying Executive Order defining the function and role of each 
uniformed service. As such, the Air Force was given authority to 
organize, train, and equip air forces for air operations including joint operations; 
to gain and maintain general air superiority; to establish local air superiority 
where and as required; to develop a strategic air force and conduct strategic air 
reconnaissance operations; to provide airlift and support for airborne operations; 
to furnish air support to land and naval forces including support of occupation 
forces; and to provide air transport for the armed forces except as provided by the 
Navy for its own use.164 
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As such, both the functional and organizational structure of U.S. air transport resources 
had fundamentally shifted toward the new U.S. Air Force. Both Army and Navy units 
alike would be required to utilize Air Force transports for their support needs, with a few 
general exceptions. As shown above, the army and navy operated independent air 
transport divisions, of which the Army’s Air Transport Command greatly outnumbered 
its naval cousin the Naval Air Transport Service. Despite the service unification of 1947, 
it was not until 1948 that Secretary of Defense James Forrestal ordered the consolidation 
of ATC and NATS into the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). As the next 
evolutionary step of U.S. air transport, MATS was the first ‘unified’ command 
combining personnel from both services under one roof and “directed…to transport 
personnel and cargo for all agencies of the National Military Establishment and also for 
other governmental agencies, as authorized.”165 From the Ferrying Division to ATC, and 
now MATS, U.S. military air transport had evolved into a worldwide force, unified under 
a singular command structure supporting all U.S. diplomatic and military missions 
around the world. By August 1, 1948 the unified force included an insufficient total of 
766 aircraft, the majority of which were C-47s and C-54s.166  Both Air Force and Navy 
leaders knew a significant adjustment period would be required, but few could have seen 
the nation’s next great geopolitical struggle just over the horizon. 
As tensions between the occupational authorities began to rise in 1947, the once 
great alliance began to crumble under the weight of competing geopolitical aspirations 
                                                           
165 Wolk, 220-21. 
166 United States Air Force History Office, A History of the United States Air Force 1907-1957, ed. 
Alfred Goldberg (New York: D. Von Nostrand Co., 1957), 150.  
68 
 
 
and socioeconomic systems. Continually weary of yet another future war with a powerful 
Germany, the Soviets wished to bleed the vanquished nation to the bone. Although 
technically bound by a quadripartite agreement, the Soviet-controlled sectors of Germany 
were brutally savaged by a wave of Red Army soldiers bent on extracting revenge.167 The 
physical segregation of the German state had been decided by the Allied powers some 
time earlier, and still even “the briefest look at a map shows that these arrangements held 
not only the seeds but the buds and even the blooms of discord and crisis.”168 
Even during the ‘peaceful’ days of the postwar German occupation, Soviet forces 
routinely showed their willingness to hamper the movement of U.S. and British forces. 
Despite earlier assurances by Marshall Georgi Zhukov that the United States and other 
Allied nations would retain access to Berlin by road and rail, no contractual obligation 
existed in writing.169 When agitated, the Soviets could restrict the flow of men and 
materiel into the sector by slowing road and rail traffic throughout the region. 
Complicating matters further was the communist-inspired coup in Czechoslovakia, and a 
civil war in Greece, which gave American political and military leaders many reasons to 
suspect further Soviet aggression.170 Military authorities soon began to propose alternate 
methods for the short-term supply of the military garrisons in Berlin should the Soviet 
intransigence escalate. As early as April 1948, the Office of Military Government, United 
States (OMGUS) began planning for the utilization of airlift as the western occupying 
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forces refused Soviet inspections of trains bound for Berlin. Initially restricted only to 
perishable items and mail, the “April Crisis” began the process of reorganization within 
the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), moving the 53rd Troop Carrier Squadron from 
Tempelhof Air Base to Rhein-Main.171 When the call came for airlifting resources into 
Berlin beginning April 4, 1948, C-47’s from the 61st Troop Carrier Group were ordered 
to carry 80 tons daily “exclusive of passengers and mail,” comprised primarily of fresh 
milk, vegetables, commissary items, and other materials deemed necessary for the 
continued support of the U.S. garrisons.172  
The reorganization and subsequent (limited) airlift began what would be later 
become known as the “Little Lift,” running from April 1948 to the beginning of the full-
blown “Operation Vittles” in June. The Little Lift missions were much more limited in 
terms of their overall objectives as well as the focus of their attention. Rather than 
looking to supply the city’s entire population, Little Lift missions were concerned with 
the support and supply of the city’s military garrisons. Few could have anticipated the 
increased provocations on the horizon. Even the Soviets saw little use in hampering these 
early airlift missions as “it was unlikely, in their estimate, that an airlift could 
succeed.”173 
The political mechanism enabling this early stockpiling by air was the creation of 
three air corridors into Berlin for use by Allied forces. Early recommendations called for 
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a total of six twenty-mile wide air corridors between Berlin and the cities of Hamburg, 
Hanover (Buckeberg), Frankfurt, Warsaw, Prague, and Copenhagen. Yet later, “during 
subsequent negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that only three, those with Hamburg, 
Buckeburg, and Frankfurt were actually necessary.”174 Whereas the Soviets readily 
blocked road and rail traffic, so too did they hint at possible interferences of both 
commercial and military air traffic. Early attempts to interfere with free and open use of 
the air corridors occurred as early as March 17, 1948 when several proposals were 
submitted to the Combined Services Directive. Intended to limit aerial access, the 
proposals stated: 
1. Proficiency training flights were to be prohibited in the corridors 
2. Aircraft would be restricted from Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) when operating 
“in clouds” except during descent operations at Tempelhof 
3. No local IFR flying would be permitted 
4. Night flying in the corridor would be permitted 
5. Information would have to be submitted to Soviet authorities on all proposed 
operations in the corridors and in the Berlin zone twenty-four hours before the 
start of such flights175 
In the end, no such interference materialized, particularly due to the difficult nature of 
enforcing the requirements of the proposals. The air corridors remained open, should the 
western powers need them, in the event of an increasingly tense political situation at the 
Control Council. 
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  Due to the last minute nature of the Little Lift missions, aircraft, spare pilots and 
crews were drafted from throughout the theater, many of whom had long since been 
given other non-flying duty. Many ‘priority’ cargoes were set on a flight-by-flight basis 
as no system was in place to streamline cargo selection and loading, much of which was 
undertaken by German civilians, mostly displaced persons or DP’s, under the supervision 
Figure 3.1 Berlin Airlift bases and flight corridors 
http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/110302-D-LN615-011.jpg 
(Accessed November 8, 2014) 
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of the U.S. military.176 The shortage of qualified personnel did not end with pilots and 
aircrew, as ground crew, mechanics, and logistical personnel arrived late as well. Rather 
than arriving prior to the establishment of air operations, many involved in the 
“housekeeping” operations arrived the same day that operations were scheduled to 
begin.177 
Alongside their American cousins, HQ British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) made 
a request as early as April 4, 1948 of the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO) to 
supply the Berlin garrison in the event of a full blockade. Subsequently, a conference was 
held April 15 to discuss the requirements for the sustainability of British garrisons in 
Berlin, should it become necessary. For a long-term blockade, it was thought 
 
the airlift would have to deliver 87 tons a day, [although] for a short 
period the garrison could manage on 65 tons; the chances were the 
operation would last a month. The plan must envisage the evacuation of 
2,000 dependents, each with 65lbs of luggage….BAFO and Transport 
Command would provide a small operating HQ, a serving echelon, and 
two air movement sections of six officers and fifteen men with sixteen 
aircraft, eight of which would put in three daily return flights each from 
Wunstorf in the zone to Gatow in the sector.178 
 
Utilizing what splintered air assets remained in theater, the British contingent would rely 
on several squadrons of C-47 Dakotas from 46 group of RAF Waterbeach, for an 
estimated daily lift of 130,000 pounds. Upon receiving final orders on June 24, 1948, 46 
Group was to leave Waterbeach and be operational within 48 hours under the codename 
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Operation ‘Knicker.’179 The British, like the Americans, relied heavily on the C-47 as the 
backbone of their airlift and transportation force. First seeing military action in 1941, 
most of these Dakotas had thousands of flight hours in every theater of World War II. In 
the case of the American fleet, many of the C-47 aircraft initially used in the airlift to 
Berlin still wore faded remnants of their pre-invasion stripes from D-Day.180 The 
Americans could muster roughly 102 C-47s for use in airlifting supplies into Berlin for 
use by the military garrisons, and out-lifting dependents and other unnecessary items and 
equipment. In addition to these, the RAF was operating roughly 150 aircraft of varying 
types, the majority also being C-47s, but included nearly forty of the larger four-engine 
AVRO York transports.181 The York was a larger and more capable airlifter derived from 
the Lancaster bomber. Though able to carry significantly more overall tonnage than the 
C-47, the York was far fewer in number and had significant maintenance issues. Several 
York aircraft converted for tanker use were particularly useful for the transport of liquid 
petroleum-oil-lubricant (POL) loads.182 On average they were capable of carrying up to 
5.5 tons of liquid cargo per trip, and accomplished the task more efficiently than other 
aircraft. 
Before long, events on the ground proved these preparations worthwhile when 
Marshall Vassily Sokolovsky, Soviet representative and that month’s chair of the Control 
Council, called a meeting for March 20, 1948. What then transpired was less unusual for 
the substance of the meeting than for the manner in which it ended. As the repetitive and 
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predictable arguments reached their crescendo, “suddenly there was a nasty shock” as 
Marshall Sokolovsky unilaterally declared the meeting adjourned and left the hall, with 
the entire Soviet delegation in tow.183 The Soviets had been increasingly insistent upon 
inspecting the papers and even the cargo of inbound Western trains for some time, but it 
had been merely a nuisance item rarely enforced after considerable delay and 
protestations by the U.S. military. Soon thereafter what had begun with train inspections 
and roadblocks quickly became an all-out blockade.  
It was unknown whether the disruptions would amount to anything more than a 
repeated irritation capable of resolution through diplomatic means or a serious blow to 
the political aims of the United States and its Allies.184 As members of the Allied Control 
Council continued to seek common ground, USAFE began ramping up planning efforts 
to aid the stockpiling of resources within Berlin in preparations for what was to come. 
Available airlift resources in 1948 were far below previous wartime strength as USAFE 
controlled only two troop carrier groups of C-47s, not the larger and more capable C-54s 
used to great effect during the last year of Hump operations. Both the 60th and 61st Troop 
Carrier Groups began “small scale” operations under the authority of Brigadier General 
Joseph Smith by June 26, 1948.185 
On June 22, 1948 General Lucius Clay, military Governor of the U.S. sector in 
Germany, ordered General Curtis LeMay and USAFE to “utilize the maximum number 
of airplanes” to transport supplies into Berlin, putting into motion what would soon be 
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deemed the Berlin Airlift or more colloquially, “Operation Vittles.”186 Initial operational 
command of the airlift went to General LeMay, Commanding General USAFE, and he 
had at his disposal roughly 107 war-weary C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft of the 60th and 
61st Troop Carrier Groups already in Germany. In addition to the C-47s, General LeMay 
immediately requested “approximately” thirty C-54s to support the air operation.187 
Along with their Royal Air Force counterparts, LeMay and his deputy commander Brig. 
Gen. Smith increased the rudimentary airlift system to the blockaded zones, stockpiling 
supplies and out-lifting dependents and nonessential personnel.  
For all his wartime gifts, the establishment and operation of an efficient airlift 
machine was not within General LeMay’s experience. He understood the challenges 
inherent in such an undertaking, and made steps to correct perceived shortcomings. 
Shortly after operations began, LeMay issued a statement outlining estimated airlift totals 
of approximately 225 tons daily, and a maximum daily output of 500 tons if he were 
given the larger C-54 aircraft.188 Though 39 C-54s were ordered from bases around the 
world, it would be some time before significant numbers arrived.189 Later estimates by 
General Smith’s staff pushed the estimates to nearly 1500 tons daily by July 10.190 These 
numbers, however, were significantly inflated based on a lack of airlift experience and 
general naiveté in relation to the establishment of airline protocols. As LeMay and Smith 
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would discover, the effective utilization of these resources required a knowledge base not 
learned in combat commands. 
As stated above, the U.S. military establishment of 1948-1949 was still reeling 
from the unification battles following the National Security Act of 1947. During this 
period, the independent branches of the service, particularly the Navy and the Air Force, 
felt as though their unique needs and technical qualifications were so drastically different 
as to retain separate air transport elements. But the existence of a unified air transport 
organization such as MATS was not altogether welcomed in Berlin. Many within the 
defense establishment viewed MATS and the Berlin crisis as existing along divergent 
paths as “the separation of tactical and strategic airlift continued, a point validated at the 
highest levels of the new defense decision-making process.”191 Due to functional 
limitations of the airlift community, a significant portion of airlift resources were 
dedicated to the support of strategic nuclear forces around the world. This shift kept 
MATS and Berlin apart, as commanders in the United States were reluctant to relinquish 
control of strategic airlift capability to Germany in light of a possible Russian counter-
attack, despite General Tunner’s recommendation that MATS should take over as it was 
specifically organized for sustained heavy airlift.192 In the end, however, MATS aircraft 
would be allotted to the airlift, but under the authority first of USAFE, and later of the 
Combined Airlift Task Force (Provisional) (CALTF). 
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From the very beginning, General Smith’s headquarters was separated into two 
main complementary divisions: Supply and Maintenance, and Operations.193 Only later 
would a Personnel section be added, once it was understood that the temporary duty 
(TDY) would be inevitably prolonged for so many men. It is significant to note that at 
this early juncture in U.S. military aviation history little can be said in terms of forward-
deployment of parts and supplies away from the continental United States. Even the 
creation of the MATS in June 1948 “excluded the responsibility for tactical air 
transportation of airborne troops and their equipment, as well as the initial supply and 
resupply of units in forward combat areas,” a division that would stifle early airlift 
progress by complicating supply chain efficiency with unnecessary bureaucratic 
wrangling.194 Though some significant stockpiles had once been stationed globally during 
wartime, little of what one could recognize as a universal presence of men and materiel 
was available, let alone logistically accessible. As such, it is not surprising to discover 
early analysis of the situation in Germany by contemporary staffers placed “proper 
servicing and maintenance of the airlift planes [as] the second most serious problem” 
confronting the men of the Berlin Airlift, second only to flying under instrument 
conditions during the foul German weather.195 Maintenance teams simply did not have 
the necessary access to tools and spare parts necessary for the operation of a large-scale 
mission. 
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Despite being in command only four weeks, General Smith’s headquarters 
oversaw a significant increase in airlift resources, as well as the expansion of the 
operation throughout the region. By the end of July, 307 pilots had reported for duty on 
the airlift (of the 320 slots available per early quotas), and each available aircraft was 
rushed into operation as quickly as possible.196 Like all other operational structures 
during the initial months of the Little Lift and Operation Vittles missions, supply and 
maintenance procedures largely fell upon the operational unit from which a particular 
aircraft or unit arrived.197 As newer, larger aircraft such as the C-54 arrived in theater, a 
more rigid supply and maintenance structure began to emerge as the ad hoc nature of 
existing resources could not meet demand since “USAFE had no supply plans or 
channels for C-54’s at the inauguration of the airlift.”198 Accordingly, the establishment 
of a base set of maintenance procedures was one key development during Smith’s short 
stint as commander of the Berlin Airlift. Drawing upon his experience as an airmail pilot 
for the Army Air Corps during the early 1930s, General Smith set up a duty and 
maintenance schedule whose goal was a minimum 65 percent operational rate.199 As a 
means of easing congestion and centralizing logistical chains, General Smith ordered all 
C-54 maintenance and inspections be undertaken at Rhein-Main as this facility retained 
facilities appropriate for aircraft of that size, and the first five C-54 aircraft arrived in 
theater by July 2, 1948.200 In contrast, the airfields at Tempelhof and Wiesbaden (among 
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others) were significantly less capable of handling the influx of traffic, both due to the 
number of takeoffs and landings as well as the overall size and weight of aircraft utilized. 
Unlike the majority of airfields within CBI, postwar Germany still retained a 
significant amount of rudimentary infrastructure from which a military air operation 
could commence. In a similar fashion to extant facilities in British-governed India, the 
facilities in Eastern Germany (particularly Berlin’s Tempelhof and Gatow), were in dire 
need of improvement and modernization in order to cope with the massive daily stresses 
incurred by the American cargo aircraft. As one contemporary account notes, at the 
beginning of the Airlift, Tempelhof air base remained largely “a grass field, with one 
sodded runway, and had been used only for comparatively small aircraft and fighter 
planes during the latter part of the war.”201 Early attempts at runway and taxiway upkeep 
proved somewhat futile, despite the comparatively lighter weight of aircraft such as the 
C-47 used at this point of the airlift. The makeshift nature of USAFE’s logistical support 
structure manifested itself frequently. During this period, repair crews laden with buckets, 
picks, shovels, and other equipment would hurriedly run out onto the runway after the 
successful landing, patching and repairing as quickly and professionally as possible until 
a loud whistle alerted them to the impending arrival of yet another aircraft, at which time 
they scurried off to the side once again. Over and over this ritual was repeated until larger 
more permanent repairs were completed.202 
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Located at the very heart of Berlin, Tempelhof was once the very pride of 
Germany’s aviation community, and stood at the center of the U.S. distributional hub for 
most supplies into the city. By July 1, 1948 General LeMay recognized the “critical” 
nature of the runway problem, and issued orders to Lt. Colonel M. Falco of the Air 
Engineer Division to begin runway surveys and make recommendations. Falco soon 
thereafter “recommended that a second asphalt-PSP [Pierced Steel Plank] runway 5,500 
feet in length, be built. His views were approved and work began on July 8, 1948.”203 
Manual labor for the demolition and construction projects at Tempelhof and other 
facilities throughout the Airlift Task Force area of operations was generally provided by 
the Germans. Given the general level of devastation inflicted upon the population during 
the immediate postwar period, multiplied greatly by the ever-crumbling local economies, 
increasing political tensions and lack of standardized currency, any amount of work 
found countless workers eager for a small wage and a meal. 
Manual construction on what would be designated the south runway was 
performed by German contractors, with the vast majority of materials, supplies, POL 
products, heavy machinery, steel, and aluminum being shipped via air into the zone of 
occupation. One of the only indigenous supplies readily available in abundant quantities 
was rubble from broken bricks and stone created by Allied air raids, which eventually 
took the place of crushed limestone. Heavy rains during this period, which were feared to 
weaken the foundation of the remaining center runway, also necessitated the delegation 
of some remaining sod runways for the sole use of C-47 aircraft during July and August 
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1948.204 Significant progress had been made by August, but it was clear to many that 
even more capacity would be needed should the airlift continue beyond its very limited 
existing operational bases. On August 20 LeMay ordered construction to begin on yet 
another (third) runway at Tempelhof.205 
The British airfield at Gatow was not altogether different from Tempelhof in that 
its resources were limited and rudimentary, yet quite suitable for postwar operations of 
the type most frequently carried out by RAF detachments. Unlike its more expansive 
cousin, Gatow had only one runway 1,500 feet in length with PSP laid directly upon the 
ground. Although RAF planners had always intended to fortify the earlier steel runway, 
no true attempts were made until after the onset of the blockade and airlift in 1948.206 In 
addition to this utilitarian approach, a more expansive and complex new runway system 
comprising some 2,000 yards of concrete runway with attached taxiways and hardstands 
began construction in 1947, but by the onset of the airlift was only three-quarters 
complete. One key difference was the manner in which Gatow was left without 
connection to a railway spur. But, in what would prove to be a fortuitous turn of chance, 
there was the Havel Lake just to the east with waters connecting to the River 
Spree and the network of canals which covered Berlin. The blockade of June 24 
had trapped forty barges on the Havel; on 28 June ten more slipped into the city. 
One tug could pull 3,000 tons for twenty-four hours while consuming only a ton 
of coal; diesel [trucks] needed 5 tons of fuel to do the same work; petrol-driven 
vehicles 15 tons. The Russians had provided the Western sectors of Berlin with 
one asset.207 
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After considerable effort, Gatow’s existing and improved surfaces continued to provide 
functional support for inbound airlift services until such time as the additional resources 
were allocated, and the airfield at Tegel was fully functional. 
 Of all the infrastructure expansions during the airlift period, Tegel most closely 
influenced the future air expeditionary force template by completely creating an aviation 
infrastructure where none previously existed. Significant remodeling and construction 
efforts at Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden limited U.S. airlift capacity during the summer of 
1948. To alleviate the problem, General LeMay ordered the development of a new 
airfield in the French sector of Berlin. A site was selected in August 1948, with a 
completion deadline set for six months later. Similar to improvements and additions at 
Tempelhof, the airfield at Tegel was largely supported by crushed brick and other 
masonry material from buildings destroyed by Allied bombing.  
Initial plans called for “a runway 5,500 feet in length and 120 feet in width, as 
well as for necessary taxi-ways, parking aprons and access roads.”208 Heavy construction 
equipment, like building supplies, was a significant challenge as few pieces were 
available in Berlin, and the available equipment was too large and unwieldy for transport 
via even the largest aircraft such as the C-74. To deal with the problem, American 
engineers simply cut the equipment into pieces, flew the pieces to Berlin, and 
reassembled them on site.209 The scope and importance of the airfield led General Tunner 
to provide significant input on the design and orientation of the Tegel airfield. He viewed 
Tegel, alongside Gatow and Tempelhof, as one piece of a single airfield system and not 
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multiple independent airfields. He oriented the Tegel field to align parallel with other 
airfields as a means of eliminating unnecessary cross-traffic in Berlin skies.210After 
several months of intense construction, USAFE personnel took control of Tegel on 
November 18, 1948 and the first C-54s landed one month later. Though the airfield’s 
infrastructure (landing lights and communications) were not completed until January, and 
heavier runways capable of handling C-74s sometime later, the completion of Tegel 
highlighted the value of purpose-built installations over adapted airfields.211 
In comparison to its American counterpart, the British Area of Occupation, from 
which the RAF supplied its share of resources, was relatively well off in terms of airfields 
and other facilities. British fields including Celle, Lübeck, Fuhlsbuttel, Finkenwerder (a 
seaplane base), and Wunstorf were primarily Luftwaffe (German AF) fighter bases free 
of serious battle damage, and had been subsequently improved and updated with more 
suitable navigation and communications equipment by the RAF.212 Unlike Gatow, 
Wunstorf had the advantage of being situated near a railway, but its relatively small size 
and lack of additional infrastructure for support personnel and vehicles made it less 
adequate for heavy transport purposes.213 These bases would, however, prove invaluable 
for the myriad specialized transportation aircraft utilized by private contractors and the 
RAF alike throughout the Berlin Airlift, and would nonetheless prove their worth beyond 
that as a home for large four-engine heavy transports.  
                                                           
210 Slayton, 144. 
211 Interview of Dr. William Sprague with First Lieutenant L.E. Stockton, USAF, Tegel Airfield 
February 16, 1949. Reproduced and cited in “USAFE and the Berlin Airlift 1948: Supply and Operational 
Aspects,” 218-19. 
212 Miller, To Save a City, 50. 
213 Tusa, 146. 
84 
 
 
The role of civilian transports during the Berlin Airlift is an often forgotten 
component that enabled the British contingent a greater degree of flexibility and overall 
success. As Robert Jackson notes in his analysis of the British side of the airlift, “as the 
daily Airlift (sic) tonnage requirement grew, it was soon realized that sufficient military 
aircraft could not be spared to provide the necessary lifting capacity.”214 In order to 
increase capacity, the RAF contracted several civilian firms specializing in the 
transportation of special cargoes (particularly fuel and oils) via aircraft such as the 
Lancastrian, a transport version of the legendary Lancaster bomber, Bristol freighters, 
Handley Page Halifax, and of course the DC-3. These firms provided a small yet valuable 
contribution to the overall British effort by transporting nearly 147,000 tons of freight 
over 22,000 flights.215 
The American zone of occupation, on the other hand, was much more limited in 
terms of available aviation resources, having but two major airports suitable for outbound 
airlift use: Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main.From early on, Rhein-Main air base would be 
utilized as the central traffic control point for the U.S. airlift. Located seven miles 
southwest of Frankfurt, Rhein-Main began its life servicing Germany’s lighter-than-air 
craft such as the Hindenburg. During World War II the base served as a home to 
Luftwaffe fighters, and later to American fighters after April 1945 when, although much 
of the base’s infrastructure was thoroughly destroyed due to massive bombing raids, U.S. 
Army engineers began the monumental task of clearing and rebuilding runways, parking 
                                                           
214 Robert Jackson The Berlin Airlift (Patrick Stephens: Wellingborough, Northamptonshire,  
1988), 97. 
215 Jackson, 122-124. 
85 
 
 
ramps, hangars, and other facilities. Within several months, by the fall of 1945, “Rhein-
Main as Europe’s ‘Gateway’ again began to emerge from the rubble of war.”216 But 
despite this early reemergence, much work was needed to enhance the utility of Rhein-
Main as a major hub for Air Force activities, and particularly for its use in support of 
major heavy lift operations to and from Berlin. 
For the duration of the independently operated Little Lift and Knicker operations, C-
47s of both the U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force did their part to sustain the needs of 
their assigned military garrisons and aid in the initial build-up of supplies in preparation 
for future blockades by Soviet Forces. It was clear to all, however, that a more concerted 
and cooperative effort would need to be made should a more permanent and large-scale 
airlift be deemed necessary. On its own, neither force possessed the technological or 
logistical capability to successfully execute a large-scale airlift. Valuable cargoes such as 
coal were stockpiled at a considerable pace, with nearly 15,000 tons delivered between 
April and June, but these limited reserves would do little during a prolonged conflict.217 
Likewise, should the need arise for the Americans and British to continue operating for 
an extended period of time, existing infrastructure and logistical support was insufficient. 
Along all fronts, supply lines, radio and navigational aids, weather services, and aircraft 
were unsatisfactory for this purpose,  
Tactically, Smith’s headquarters relied on an expanded version of the Block 
System to increase tonnage delivered. Within this block system, modeled on World War 
II CBI tactics, aircraft were dispatched in 6-hour blocks with an aircraft taking off every 
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three to five minutes during peak operations. Complicating matters was the mix of 
aircraft with varying levels of performance, as C-54 cruise speeds were set at 180 mph 
indicated air speed (IAS), while C-47s operated at 150 mph IAS.218 As the various blocks 
were slowed by weather or ground delays, the entire system could grind to a halt. 
Technical difficulties could also hamper smooth operations as engine malfunctions and 
faulty speed gauges frequently disrupted the spacing of aircraft within a given block, and 
limited availability of navigation beacons and Ground Control Approach (GCA) units 
rendered timely landing sequences extremely difficult.219 
Despite Smith’s best efforts to enhance the GCA capabilities in and around Berlin 
through more training and resources, the air traffic control and weather forecasting 
elements of the Airlift Task Force (ATF) was severely limited.220 Whereas weather 
drastically impacted flight operations throughout World War II, it did so on a very grand 
scale across thousands of feet of vertical altitude and thousands of square miles. In 
Berlin, though, the situation was drastically different as “operations demanded 
knowledge of the exact ceiling and visibility, for 50 feet of visibility or ¼ mile of 
visibility either way could open or close an airfield.”221 Likewise, the American and 
British pilots were forced to keep strict adherence to air corridors, spacing between 
aircraft, communications with ground control, and flight conditions throughout the route. 
Smith’s team had meticulously created redundant procedures to enhance safety and 
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improve efficiency. As stated in a memorandum titled “Traffic Rules and Procedures for 
Operations,” air discipline was of paramount importance: 
The continuous flow, at short intervals, of aircraft engaged in Operations Vittles 
demands exacting air discipline on the part of all crews. Except in emergencies 
pilots must follow the route patterns, rules and procedures set forth….Failure to 
do so will sooner or later lead to disaster.222 
When it came to the instruments of air transport, the C-47’s continued to hold the line, 
but their “limited cargo capacity frustrated those concerned with the buildup of supplies, 
and their age and worn condition hindered the maintenance and supply personnel who 
had to keep them in the air. In one example, intergranular corrosion and cracks in the 
fittings of the landing-gear bracing strut attachment grounded many C-47s at a cost of 
some 850 hours in inspection and maintenance.”223 Though General LeMay and his 
British counterpart had both requested reserve forces of larger aircraft, it would be some 
time before their arrival from other locations around the world. 
Over the course of May and June the situation in Germany continued to deteriorate. 
Intelligence Division (ID) officers in Germany began worrying as to whether Russian 
provocations, such as stopping coal trains and possibly halting traffic over the Elbe River 
bridge, would lead to yet another more complete blockade. A key communication during 
this period questioned Soviet intentions to this effect and wondered whether “air transport 
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facilities exist for supplying German population in Western Sectors of Berlin (estimated 2 
million) in addition to Western Allied Forces in Berlin.”224 
Soon thereafter, General Clarence Heubner (Commanding General EUCOM), issued 
orders stipulating that USAFE would utilize the maximum number of flights and aircraft 
possible to transport supplies into Templehof Air Field in Berlin, officially beginning 
flights to be christened Operation Vittles by the United States forces.225 Still considering 
all potential options, General Lucius Clay remained unconvinced of the potential for 
airlift alone to supply the food, fuel, and other necessities for the civilian population of 
western Berlin. He understood full well the implications, both political and military, of 
failure in this new mission. Throughout the month of June, Clay pushed back and forth 
against his superiors in Washington toward what would become the ultimate strategy. 
It was unclear at the time what, if any, additional assistance his command would 
receive from the American military establishment in the continental United States or from 
MATS outposts around the world. It was also unclear whether the British contingent 
could supply sufficient aircraft, men and resources to positively impact any future 
airlift.226 In response to queries by Clay, whom General LeMay described as “not being 
in the airplane business” and “obviously not [realizing] that when he talked tonnages of 
such prodigious amount, it was far beyond our capacity to operate,” on June 26, 1948 
General LeMay put forth a preliminary analysis of continuing USAFE airlift capabilities. 
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227 Stating that an initial sustained lift of 225 tons daily would be possible in good 
weather months, but for a maximum sustained airlift of 500 tons daily as requested he 
advised that “in addition to present units, approximately thirty C-54 aircraft would be 
necessary if this command were committed to such an operation.”228 LeMay’s estimates 
were extremely generous given the limited support structure and challenging flight 
conditions, and in retrospect it is clear that General LeMay’s judgment was tainted by a 
lack of transport experience. 
Prior to his assignment as Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe 
in 1947, Lt. General Curtis LeMay’s reputation as one of the greatest air combat 
commanders of World War II was well established. Less well-established, and soon to be 
tested, was his ability to manage the frustratingly different variables inherent in 
diplomatic issues. His situation was made particularly worse given the political rather 
than military situation with the Soviets, as he would readily admit “diplomacy was an art 
in which no one had ever accused him of displaying talent.”229 Complicating matters 
further, USAFE and the ground forces supporting it were mere shadows of their former 
selves. Prior to and throughout the Little Lift operations, General LeMay set about the 
process of organizing USAFE forces, both combat and transport units, into a functional 
state whereby they could more adeptly respond to any and all forthcoming circumstances. 
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Without significant combat forces at his disposal, one of the most critical 
elements of LeMay’s early strategy was an element of force protection contingent upon 
deterrence rather than numerical strength. In many ways this combination of tactical 
defense and strategic deterrence would become the doctrinal backdrop for all future U.S. 
forward air operating bases, particularly in hostile nations during wartime. Central to 
LeMay’s strategy was the use of the American nuclear monopoly to deter Soviet 
intervention against the airlift forces. To this end, LeMay ordered the forward 
deployment of U.S. strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain and the European 
mainland. Almost as soon as the Soviets began interfering with ground transportation, 
military officials understood the need to project at least a moderate capacity for war, 
despite the general imbalance of forces. 
During these immediate postwar years, the B-29 Superfortress strategic bomber 
represented the “pre-eminent symbol of American air power.”230 As the only aircraft to 
have dropped atomic weapons in anger, the B-29 carried a great symbolic weight 
wherever it traveled, and as such it was the mainstay of the newly created Strategic Air 
Command. In June 1948, the 301st Bombardment Group, based at Salina Air Force Base, 
Kansas was already on training duty at Furstenfeldbruck air base near Munich. An 
estimation of overall support strength, requested by Secretary James Forrestal via 
Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, highlighted the availability of some “three 
Medium Bomber Groups, with thirty B-29s each, which could depart twelve hours after 
notification, [and] three additional Medium Bomber Groups, also with thirty B-29s each, 
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[which] could begin departure within ten days.”231 The arrival of B-29s in Europe, 
signaling a firm American commitment to the stabilization of a free and democratic 
Germany, was further solidified when the Clement Attlee government formally 
acknowledged an earlier basing agreement, at which time a joint agreement was made on 
July 16, 1948, regarding the basing and logistical concerns for B-29 aircraft, crew, and 
support personnel.232  
The true ruse, and what was not known at the time, was the nature of the deployed 
force. Despite being one of the most advanced aircraft in the world, all B-29s deployed to 
Europe in support of Berlin Airlift operations were entirely conventional. While several 
units within the U.S. Air Force had begun converting earlier B-29s to a nuclear-capable 
configuration under Project Silverplate, and later Project Saddletree, none of the aircraft 
available in Europe had this capability.233 It is unknown whether the Russians were aware 
of this critical fact. 
 Regardless of the political backdrop, a fundamental fact remained: the Allied 
Airlift in support of Berlin was falling short of expectations. If the United States, Great 
Britain and France did not wish to cede control of Berlin, a larger and more efficient 
program was necessary. As with Ferrying Division efforts into China, few airlift 
professionals were involved in the initial ‘barnstorming’ days of the Berlin Airlift. 
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Though the usefulness of airlift had been proven in China during a wartime scenario, the 
situation in Berlin was unique, and “in air transport everything is different – rules, 
methods, attitudes, procedures, results.”234 By June and July, tonnage into Berlin had 
risen sharply to more than 2000 tons, but it was far from an efficient operation as the city 
needed 3800 tons per day in the summer and more than 4500 in the winter.235 
Despite the significant challenges ahead, General Smith had laid the groundwork for 
a continued effort. Throughout the summer USAFE increased the supply of pilots and 
crew, installed and expanded rudimentary air traffic control and navigation beacons, 
established the weather evaluation and forecasting procedures, and formed a rough 
logistical base as a means to maintain a “semblance of order and avoidance of risks.”236 
As in China, however, true efficiency required a level of professionalism not found 
within USAFE or the early leaders of the provisional airlift task force. From the earliest 
days of the Berlin crisis, General Tunner and other airlift veterans looked from afar and 
understood the value of their experience. As he explained, 
The first thing I did was encourage my new commander [General Lawrence 
Kuter] to get himself involved in this, because I said, ‘You have just been 
organized as the air transport forces of the Department of Defense….We have the 
trained people, not only the crews but the airplanes; we’ve got the technicians 
behind the crews; we’ve got the traffic people...and we have a very experienced 
staff who understands the business of air transportation, which is not flying 
bombers or fighters or something else.237 
He was soon proven correct. The introduction of General Tunner as Commanding 
General of the Combined Airlift Task Force several months later provided a much needed 
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infusion of both professional knowledge and logistical competency. Understood as the 
preeminent authority on airlift within the U.S. military, and possibly the world at the 
time, General Tunner was supremely qualified and more than eager to prove his theories 
would work within the geographical and political constraints of postwar Germany. 
Moreover, as a veteran commander of the Hump operations and a highly qualified pilot, 
Tunner understood firsthand the intricacies such an endeavor required. 
General Orders Number 61 granted Tunner the authority to organize preexisting 
airlift bases under his command, including Rhein-Main, Wiesbaden, and Tempelhof, and 
set up the 7499th Air Division as the Airlift Task Force (Provisional) under the 
Headquarters (USAFE).238 In addition to this assignment, Tunner was also given control 
over the newly designated Combined Airlift Task Force (CALTF). Intended to streamline 
the process, CALTF combined U.S. and British airlift resources into one unified group 
“in order that the resources of each participating service may be utilised (sic) in the most 
advantageous manner.”239 Initial objectives of Tunner’s command were establishment of 
basic command and control procedures, and the creation and establishment of an 
institutional hierarchy that could work as efficiently as possible while also limiting 
unnecessary bureaucracy. His early changes included the implementation and widespread 
adoption of a systematized method for dealing with all manner of possible needs 
including depot supply and maintenance, technological support, weather operations, 
intelligence, logistics, personnel, and many others. Daily staff meetings, crucial to the 
development of Hump operations, became the norm in Germany as well. During the 
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operational planning and development stages, staff of HQ Airlift Task Force 
(Provisional) “met virtually every normal work day during the month of August. One of 
the most important of these staff conferences was the one of 9 August, 1948. At this 
meeting the following [policy was] adopted….The dissemination of pertinent information 
to wing, groups and squadrons by use of bulletin boards, and by announcement at staff 
meetings of lower echelons.”240 This process ensured thorough understanding, at all 
levels, of command expectations and virtually eliminated the radical “end of the line” 
morale issues witnessed during Hump operations in China and India. 
From the outset, General Tunner assembled an operational team with a significant 
understanding of airlift. He hoped to lean on the experience of these previous airlift 
operations to streamline the Berlin effort and eliminate some of the growing pains 
already experienced by the combat commanders currently in charge. Like the early days 
of the China ferry operation, U.S. military commitments in the region were formed by 
combat units, with little knowledge of dedicated air transport. LeMay, Smith and the men 
who flew under their command understood the routine operation of air transport on a 
limited scale, but did not have the knowledge to restructure the resources into an efficient 
machine.241 
A preeminent example of the confusion and disorganized nature of the lift took 
place on what would become known as Black Friday. On Friday August 13, 1948, 
General Tunner and several subordinates took off from Wiesbaden, destined to deliver 
their cargo in Berlin some time later. What transpired was a “date many of us who served 
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on the Berlin Airlift wish we could forget.”242 Severe weather had dropped the 
operational ceiling to rooftop levels, several C-54s crashed, and the inadequate air traffic 
control radar was overwhelmed by the ever increasing number of inbound aircraft. As 
Tunner related: 
With all that confusion on the ground, the traffic-control people began stacking up 
the planes coming in.…God knows why there were no collisions. As their planes 
bucked around like gray monsters in the murk, the pilots filled the air with chatter, 
calling in constantly in near panic to find out what was going on.243 
In Tunner’s eyes, the seemingly efficient operation was far from perfect, both on the 
ground and in the air. He instructed a complete review of airlift operations, from which a 
significant number of operational issues were found. General training and briefing of 
pilots was spotty at best, shortages of tools and equipment hampered routine and 
scheduled maintenance for the aircraft, and Task Force Headquarters “was a warren of 
empty rooms silted with debris, lit only by naked bulbs, innocent of desks and chairs.”244 
Aside from a lack of resources, airlift headquarters was hampered by several logistical 
problems. A lack of accurate data and information “rendered ‘exceedingly difficult’ the 
accomplishment of accurate planning as to personnel requirements,” and an unclear 
organizational structure all served to limit the general effectiveness of ATF 
headquarters.245 In Tunner’s eyes, it could survive a month of intense operations, maybe 
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more, but “it couldn’t have lasted much longer….They were working like hell,” yet little 
progress was being made. 246 
 The fundamental problems witnessed from April to July 1948 were organizational 
and technological in nature. Logistically, the U.S. Air Force had not shifted to its 
eventual Cold War norms. The postwar Air Force was severely limited in support 
infrastructure, as the American military had little experience maintaining a large 
standing, combat-ready force in waiting. What they had in droves, however, were men 
with combat experience. Pilots, aircrew, mechanics, and support personnel were rushed 
into emergency action once the Berlin Crisis arose, but with little direction and no 
available supply of aircraft, tools, and spare parts. Technologically, the impact of an 
aging airlifter force combined with a lack of support infrastructure multiplied the lack of 
resources by several order of magnitude. The newly unified military still exhibited the 
growing pains of a freshly minted superpower, and both money and resources were not 
yet allocated to support future levels of U.S. commitment to its allies. Unlike the modern 
U.S. defense posture, forward bases on friendly (and not so friendly) soil were not yet the 
operational norm and few high-quality forward bases existed. Likewise, “modern” 
aviation support technologies were not in place. Although great strides had been made to 
develop and distribute radio navigation equipment, weather forecasting and other 
technologies, they were not yet in place worldwide. Aircraft technologies also made great 
strides, as large four-engine cargo planes and other specialized aircraft such as the C-82 
came into wider use, but remained limited in their availability. As in any endeavor, 
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technology and a support base will never reach true efficiency without an organizational 
structure to manage and utilize the resources at hand. 
 One of Tunner’s immediate organizational concerns was the establishment of a 
functional unified command and control structure that eliminated the duplication and 
confusion that existed during the initial months in Berlin. By unifying British and 
American airlift resources, Tunner and CALTF could more adequately control not only 
the effective utilization of resources, but the means through which information filtered 
throughout the command. Expanding upon General Smith’s Operations and 
Supply/Maintenance Divisions, several other key organizational elements were added 
including an Air Comptroller, Personnel, Traffic, and Communications Divisions. By 
mid-August, the Plans and Projects Division, Staff Surgeon and Public Relations 
segments were also added.247 Continuing a practice he had started in CBI, Tunner and his 
headquarters staff, comprised of each department head, met daily to discuss operational 
and planning issues. Each department head, therefore, was tasked with “[maintaining] a 
continuous contact with the division of the Air Force that provides the service...that he 
represents” as a means of meeting the daily needs and requirements of each section.248 
Though the structural changes of August and September greatly improved the efficiency 
of command and control within the airlift task force, it was an evolutionary process that 
continued throughout the remainder of 1948 and early 1949 as a means of managing the 
bureaucracy. 
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One byproduct of the restructured operational chain of command, largely resulting 
from a statistical analysis of aircraft usage, was the reallocation of resources across 
British and American zones. Once a unified command had taken control, USAFE and 
CALTF could use all resources to the fullest.249 Among these were the planes themselves 
and the support facilities (air bases and support personnel) which took part. From the 
beginning, both the USAF and RAF incorporated C-47 and other aircraft types as 
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efficiently as possible, but it was clear that many efforts were redundant and each 
available airfield was not used as completely as possible. A case in point was the British 
airfield at Fassberg, which was originally constructed as a Luftwaffe bombing school, 
and was later operated as a RAF support facility. By mid-1948 an expansion program had 
commenced, including 
the complete renovation of twelve barrack blocks and the former technical school, 
the conversion of two hangar annexes and two office buildings into domestic 
accommodation, the clearance of some five acres of forest, and the laying of 
about 180,000 square yards of PSP hardstanding and five miles of railway 
sidings.250 
Preparations for USAFE/CALTF use of Fassberg began on August 4, 1948 when a 
planning group established a twenty-three point plan outlining an organization and use 
arrangement between USAF and RAF. The plan generally outlined current and future 
infrastructure improvements, outlined the support and supply functions of the base (with 
significant details down to food and laundry service), and broadly defined the command 
and control basis for C-54 operations.251 Fassberg was considerably closer to Berlin than 
the airfields near Frankfurt, enabling more frequent trips with each aircraft requiring far 
less on-board fuel. Shorter flight times and less fuel consumption would enable higher 
payload capacities and increased tonnage. Per the assessments of the period, each C-54 
aircraft stationed at Fassberg equaled roughly 1.6 aircraft stationed in and around 
Frankfurt. In addition to the geographical advantages, Fassberg also “enjoyed weather 
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satisfactory for flights when the two fields in the Frankfurt area were ‘closed in.’”252 
Similar arrangements were made for additional British bases at Celle, Fuhslbüttel, 
Lübeck, Schleswigland, Wunstorf, and Bückeberg.253 Simply put, organizational 
efficiency improved airlift output, and every effort was made to streamline their efforts 
for the duration of airlift operations. 
Alongside a reorganization of airlift personnel and resources, Tunner’s tenure in 
Berlin witnessed several significant technological developments that would forever alter 
the landscape of military airlift. The development of larger more capable airlifters, and 
the support infrastructure to accompany them, completed the evolution of airlift from an 
unproven adjunct to a fully proven professional service. From its origins in Burma, until 
Tunner’s arrival in Berlin over five years later, U.S. airlift capacity came into its own, 
adopting technologies that would define all future air mobility specifications. Though a 
complete analysis of the design, construction and implementation of these technologies 
would comprise hundreds of pages, they can broadly be defined within a few distinct 
categories. From August 1948 until the end of the blockade, USAF personnel improved 
both the accuracy and reliability of weather forecasting, expanded the communications 
and navigation network in the region, and employed newer and more capable aircraft. 
Despite the significant challenges that remained, USAFE continued its progression 
toward a new ‘modern’ air force structure capable of sustained high-intensity air 
operations. Where the early decades of professional aviation relied heavily on pilot skill 
and a fair measure of luck, the future airpower era took advantage of technological 
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prowess rather than brute strength to achieve its goals. Though not uniquely American, 
the reliance upon technology to increase safety, survivability and efficiency proved to be 
a hallmark of American military tactics and strategy. 
 Without a doubt, weather exists as the most direct challenge to safe aviation 
operations. Few elements impact safe and efficient aviation more than weather, and the 
period of 1938-1949 saw U.S. airmen operating within some of the most challenging 
meteorological conditions known to man. From the mountain peaks and jungles of CBI, 
to the foggy and rain-soaked German airfields, American pilots fought the elements with 
deadly consequences. Complicating matters further, aircrew inexperience exacerbated the 
situation as green pilots took to the crowded skies in unfamiliar aircraft.254 At the onset of 
airlift missions the responsibility for theater weather operations fell to the 18th Weather 
Squadron. The 18th WS, alongside several support elements, compiled a wide range of 
meteorological information from the previous fifteen years, creating an almanac of sorts 
from which an estimate of suitable flight operations was compiled.255 It was soon found, 
however, that airlift pilots were operating under conditions unseen in aviation history. 
Existing weather stations at Rhein-Main, Wiesbaden and Tempelhof provided 
sufficient reports for the limited air operations into postwar Berlin, but were inadequate 
for the round-the-clock operations dictated by present events. In addition to increased 
traffic, weather stations were tasked with the compilation and dissemination of highly 
detailed information that simply did not exist in 1948. If useful information for such tight 
operating tolerances was needed, “special observations would have to be taken, special 
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charts and maps drawn, and special forecasts made.”256 Early on, pilots submitted 
weather reports every six hours. These reports tasked several aircraft within the ‘block 
system’ then in use to give the status and location of several meteorological data 
points.257 This practice was a holdover from wartime flight operations throughout Europe 
and CBI, but proved unsuitable for the heavy sustained operations in and around Berlin. 
Additional high-level reports were compiled through the use of weather balloons, though 
these were few and far between, and proved to be increasingly delinquent during the 
onset of winter weather in November 1948. These balloon facilities, however useful, 
were “entirely too scattered in the Low Countries and northern France, and few or none 
were being made in the [English] Channel and the North Sea.”258 In the end, however, 
some of the most valuable coping mechanisms were operational, rather than 
technological. Tunner and his team organized ‘diversion’ routes enabling pilots to 
continue along established flight paths to secondary landing zones.259 
 Despite operational changes enabling faster turnaround times during optimal 
flight conditions, a more wide-ranging weather establishment was needed to support the 
18th WS which was frequently undermanned due to personnel shortages. The creation of 
the 7169th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron was one step toward alleviating stresses of 
existing weather reporting stations, while taking a multidimensional approach to report 
weather and in-flight conditions. The stated role of the 7169th was “to ascertain icing 
levels and levels of severe turbulence” as a means of providing “guides for assigning 
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altitudes and intervals for dispatching air lift planes.”260 Perhaps the greatest 
improvement throughout the weather services in Berlin was the establishment of 
constant, and routine, dissemination of weather data. Contemporary accounts note the 
increased frequency of weather briefings, “presented at practically any time or place they 
were needed.”261 Despite the vast improvements, it was clear that the meteorological data 
in 1948-1949 was constrained by available technology. Though the Air Weather Services 
continued to implement new and more accurate methods, few of these methods alone 
proved game-changing. Pilots were frequently aided by other technologies such as Very 
High Frequency (VHF) navigation beacons and high-capacity landing lights, as well as 
adjusting flight paths and shifting operations away from the worst weather. 262 Regardless 
of the difficulties experienced, USAFE took several major steps toward becoming a truly 
all-weather air force. 
 In conjunction with the weather service, USAFE and the airlift task force adopted 
similar technological advances in the realm of aerial navigation and communications 
technology. From the beginning of powered flight, aerial navigation and communication 
equipment were limiting factors in the growth and development of efficient aviation 
networks. Much like everywhere else within USAFE, communications personnel and 
infrastructure were severely limited during the postwar period, with only one GCA set in 
and around Berlin, one radar unit for traffic control, and limited use of radio navigation 
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beacons.263Planners soon realized the inherent technological limitations within Berlin’s 
air traffic control center. However limited the postwar systems were, they were suitable 
for the low-intensity operations prior to 1948 when the air corridors were far less 
crowded.  
Early USAF concerns centered on the possibility of a Soviet attempt to jam radio 
communications throughout the region; this never occurred, despite contingency plans.264 
To avoid “international incidents” prior to a unified air traffic control system, 200/400 
Kcs band beacons were installed to keep aircraft within the 20-mile wide corridors.265 
Once large scale operations commenced, USAFE rushed to train greater numbers of 
communications personnel to man the radio and radar terminals. By late 1948, the Task 
Force had worked to alleviate many of the preliminary logistical and operational issues 
that plagued air operations, but the lack of accuracy and efficiency of radio/radar 
installations was a continued nuisance. 
 The introduction of the AN/CPS-5 radar and communications network, in 
conjunction with the existing waypoint beacons, proved to be a decisive and 
groundbreaking development in the history of USAF and the Berlin Airlift. It provided 
centralized control over every aircraft within the Berlin area of operations and enabled 
U.S. and British controllers to manage airlift traffic without need for ‘stacking’ of 
aircraft. A February 1949 report on its operation showed that it was “out of commission” 
only .5% of the time and “could provide complete control of all air traffic of the Western 
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Powers in the Berlin area.”266 By March of that year, the CPS-5 had expanded to include 
three locations at Tempelhof, Gatow and Tegel Approach Control centers. Each section 
had a separate feeder scope with a complete set of radio frequencies. Each 
section, moreover, was staffed for complete coverage during every twenty-four 
hour period….The CPS-5 personnel endeavored to pick up and identify the 
aircraft as soon as possible prior to their reaching the Berlin area, so that proper 
separation, interval, altitude and landing patterns could be determined.267 
This technology was not altogether without its faults. It was found that GCA units were 
not overhauled and repaired on a regular basis and that the CPS-5 needed additional non-
radar inputs to make full use of the available information. Many new communications 
technologies continued to enter service throughout the Berlin Airlift, and many of these 
provided valuable lessons for both engineers and military tacticians. Alongside its 
ground-based counterparts, nearly three quarters of airlift C-54s were also equipped with 
airborne radars suitable for rudimentary navigation and collision-avoidance purposes.268 
Regardless of these challenges, the use of radar equipment and new radio technologies to 
more effectively manage large-scale aerial maneuvers was a major evolutionary step in 
USAFE tactics, and assisted in roughly half of the 88,000 total GCA controlled landings 
during Operation Vittles.269 Though many analyses of the period highlight the importance 
of the Block System to overall airlift output, the yield and efficiency of this system would 
have been severely limited without increased use of radar tracking and GCA 
technologies. These methods, and the numbers they produced, were unthinkable only a 
few years before.  
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 In conjunction with increased use and efficiency of radar and radio 
communications equipment, USAFE proved the efficacy of a standardized fleet of larger 
transport aircraft. Though the superiority of the C-54 had been known since its 
introduction to service in CBI five years earlier, true standardization would not take place 
until late 1948 when the last of the C-47s operated by the 60th Troop Carrier Group were 
relieved of front-line airlift duty.270 From this point forward, the overwhelming majority 
of airlift flights were undertaken with the larger and more capable C-54, with a total of 
203 aircraft assigned to the theater.271 As a means of keeping this force operational, a 
system of routine ‘depot maintenance’ began through which the aircraft underwent 
scheduled inspections and overhauls both after 200 hours of service, and 1000 hours of 
service. As Tunner describes: 
Airplanes require constant maintenance, and they also require periodic 
maintenance at every twenty-five hours of flight up to two hundred hours, when 
they undergo a major inspection. At one thousand hours, a comprehensive 
overhaul must be performed….There was a serious shortage of tools and spare 
parts in the theater, and it was just not possible to do everything at the same 
time.272 
A major problem of the airlift was the creation and maintenance of an infrastructure 
capable of supporting routine depot maintenance as well as unplanned ‘as needed’ 
repairs. Pre-blockade stock levels of replacement parts and support personnel were no 
longer feasible, and available manpower was greatly enhanced. Increased manpower and 
resources of two airlift support bases at Burtonwood (England) and Erding (Germany) 
relieved some maintenance pressures, but it would take some time before the stated goal 
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of seven 200 hour inspections per day was reached.273 Despite the changes, the problems 
remained as routine scheduled maintenance was vital to the airlift effort, and the materiel 
sections continually pushed for supply chain efficiency and an increased proficiency of 
maintenance personnel.274 With increased support and professionalization of the 
maintenance teams, the C-54s proved an immense improvement over all other existing 
U.S. and British aircraft. Its combination of carrying capacity, speed, and ease of 
maintenance and operation enabled it to remain a key part of the USAFE airlifter fleet for 
years to come. 
 Despite its major improvements and usefulness, the C-54 remained a largely 
civilian-led design effort. It was not a purely military design, and required some 
significant alterations throughout World War II and beyond to remain relevant. For 
example, the aircraft was not routinely loaded to maximum gross weight due to the 
limitations of its braking system originally designed under specifications for civilian 
transport use.275 As such, Air Force leaders continued to push for more capable aircraft 
designed for military use from the start. Several of these designs made their operational 
debut, however limited, during the latter half of the Berlin Airlift. The first of these was 
the C-82 Packet produced by Fairchild Aircraft, which was introduced to the airlift in 
September 1948. The C-82 was a relatively small twin-engine aircraft whose key design 
feature was a clamshell-type loading door at the rear of the aircraft. Located between 
twin tail booms, the clamshell door allowed easy load/offload and provided a superior 
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means of transporting large and unwieldy pieces of equipment. Their rear-cargo loading 
enabled the rather diminutive aircraft (as compared to the C-74) to easily load cars, trucks 
and construction equipment.276 Though Tunner had planned only to use the C-82 for a 
limited time, their “particular value changed his mind,” remaining in service for several 
months and leading to the larger and more capable C-119 Flying Boxcar that would go on 
to serve throughout the next several decades.277 
 Another seminal aircraft to see action in Berlin was the enormous C-74 
Globemaster I, which transported its first flight into Berlin on August 17, 1948. The 
Globemaster originated from a wartime design requirement for a truly “worldwide” 
transport. Though the war ended before full-scale production could begin, fourteen C-74s 
were produced by the end of 1945. In comparison to its counterparts, the C-74 was a 
massive aircraft. At the time of its first flight 
the 86-ton C-74 was the largest transport landplane yet produced in 
quantity.…The Globemaster I had a maximum range of 7,250 miles, sufficient to 
navigate the globe with only two stops.…Its capacious fuselage could 
accommodate either 125 troops, 115 stretchers and medical attendants, or up to 
48,150 lb of cargo.278 
In terms of sheer performance, the C-74 outperformed the C-54 in both speed and cargo 
capacity. Some in theater recommended the complete replacement of the C-54 fleet with 
C-74s, but the aircraft was available in such limited numbers that this was not possible. 
Likewise, only the most robust and enhanced airfields (such as Tegel and Rhein-Main) 
could handle the gross weights and pressure of operating such a large aircraft. Despite the 
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shortcomings of existing infrastructure and supply chain to support such a large aircraft, 
it laid the groundwork for future USAFE airlift doctrine: larger aircraft meant fewer 
aircraft and trips, less fuel consumed, and a “greater margin for safety.”279 The great 
success of the C-74 platform led Douglas and the Air Force to adapt one of the original 
airframes into an even more capable aircraft: the C-124 Globemaster II. The C-124 
retained much of the C-74’s internal structural components, while “externally the new 
aircraft was characterized by its double-deck fuselage…and by its impressive rounded 
nose which incorporated clamshell loading doors and a built-in double ramp.” Though it 
would not serve in the Berlin Airlift, and was produced for only five years, the C-124 
remained in active service until the introduction of the truly massive Lockheed C-5A in 
the 1970s .280 
A smaller aircraft relying heavily upon a proven World War II design was the 
Boeing Model 367, later known as the C-97 Stratofreighter. The 367 prototypes, which 
were ordered in the fall 1942 and took flight two years later, were a design that evolved 
from the B-29 Superfortress strategic bomber and its advanced cousin, the B-50. The 
bulk of the aircraft’s underlying structure remained identical to the B-29/B-50, but to gain 
the required cargo capacity “a double-lobe fuselage of two intersecting circular sections 
was developed.” 281 Cargo loading was enabled (again) by clamshell doors and an 
electro-mechanical hoist system. Equipped with four 3,500 horsepower Pratt and 
Whitney R-4360 engines, the C-97 had a gross operating weight of up to 175,000 pounds 
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and a cargo capacity of 20 tons.282 While operating in the Berlin Airlift, the C-97 was 
found to be entirely satisfactory in everyday operations. Its three loading doors increased 
the ease of loading and unloading, and the overall capacity was far greater than the C-54. 
But due to the limited experience in handling the C-97, as well as its limited support 
infrastructure, the Stratofreighter was hampered by several maintenance problems 
limiting its overall effectiveness to a modest 444 tons delivered over twenty-three flights. 
283 The C-97 series of aircraft continued in service as the KC-97 Stratotanker until the 
late 1950s, and was the first dedicated aerial refueling platform. An even more 
elaborately modified member of the family was the Boeing 377-PG Pregnant Guppy and 
Super Guppy aircraft designed to airlift large sections of rocket and spacecraft 
components for NASA and the U.S. space program. 284 
Despite their limited roles in the airlift, these aircraft and their technological 
descendants were tested in high tempo, high stress environment. This testing enabled 
engineers and military planners to improve designs based on real world experience. In 
evaluating the usefulness and utility of different design features, engines, and the 
functionality of aircraft-specific tactics, the USAF airlift community gained invaluable 
insights that would shape future airlift design and doctrine. 
By 1949 the airlift was in full bloom, with tonnages steadily increasing as the 
Soviet hopes diminished for a complete withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. As a 
show of force, CALTF forces (under Tunner’s command) finally broke the will of the 
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Soviets during their “Easter Parade” where over the course of 24 hours aircrews 
completed 1,398 flights for a combined delivery of 12,941 tons. As Tunner noted, “from 
then on we never fell below nine thousand tons a day; the land blockade was 
pointless.”285 The blockade itself ended on May 29, 1949, and on August 12 Tunner 
received orders regarding the deactivation of the Combined Airlift Task Force, effective 
September 1, 1949, including the commencement of “such action as is necessary to 
complete the deactivation on the effective date, including the reassignment of functions 
and personnel.”286 
As the last few aircraft unloaded their precious cargoes within the city of Berlin it 
soon became clear that a new era had dawned in the age of geopolitical relations and 
technological progress. For nearly a year a population of 2.5 million people had been 
supplied, kept alive, by technologies and methods never before seen on such a scale. The 
age of manned, powered flight was less than a half-century old and yet it had enabled the 
United States Air Forces in Europe to rebuff the Soviet Union’s attempt to besiege the 
western sectors of Berlin and allowed for the continued survival of a democratic West 
Berlin. The successes of the Berlin Airlift, and of U.S. airpower during the immediate 
postwar era, exist as far more than the Cold War origin story many historians have made 
it out to be.287 Unlike previous military airlift operations, the Berlin Airlift was unique in 
both the scope of the project at hand, and in the manner in which the logistical and 
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operational structure of U.S. air transport capabilities enabled the peaceful resolution of a 
major geopolitical confrontation. In Berlin, the existence of an aviation infrastructure 
enabled U.S. policymakers to avoid war and provided direct diplomatic choices where 
none previously existed. Even at the outset of World War II, less than a decade earlier, 
little thought had been given to American military airlift, and “airmen had neither special 
aircraft nor doctrine…[and] with the exception of transporting high value items, there had 
been no thought to airlifting troops or supplies.”288 
As such, the requirements necessary to supply and maintain a major airlift, as well 
as the political requirements to aid cooperation between allied nations, were developed 
daily by the men taking part. In a role unique to its time and place in history, the Berlin 
Airlift would have a profound effect on entire sectors of aviation systems, while actually 
designing and testing new aircraft types and specialized design features that would assist 
future airlift tactics and strategy into the 21st Century. As proof of concept the Berlin 
Airlift, along with its World War II bomber brethren, effectively completed the 
geopolitical shift in the balance of power toward the United States. What Generals Billy 
Mitchell and Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold began several decades earlier triumphed when the 
Soviet Union ended the blockade in 1949. 
For over a year, airpower and airpower alone had succeeded in maintaining a 
beachhead for democracy in a sea of Soviet aggression. Rather than abandon a city and 
its people, the British and Americans hauled over 2.3 million tons of supplies into the 
city. The United States undertook 189,963 total flights, while the British added 87,606, 
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with a total airlift cost of $166,689,517.289 Beyond the monetary costs, 31 American 
servicemen lost their lives, most due to crashes and other accidents. The USAFE had 
forever changed the way American policymakers viewed the role and capabilities of 
airlift. The United States would heavily invest in new and more capable transports 
throughout the remainder of the Cold War and beyond. The evolutionary contributions of 
the Berlin Airlift, largely the result of General Tunner’s philosophy, went beyond the 
logistical expertise learned through his time in the Ferrying Command and CBI airlift. 
The Americans took advantage of revolutionary methodological and technological 
advances that would forever shape the future of their military strategy. This strategy, 
based largely on mobility and the use of technology, was proven effective in the skies of 
Berlin. 
  
                                                           
289 Berlin Airlift: A USAFE  Summary, 172-175. 
114 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The close of intensive air operations into Berlin signaled the end of one mission 
and the beginning of a transformative period within the U.S. defense establishment. By 
1950, the U.S. military began the long process of Cold War mobilization that would see 
trillions of dollars devoted to the development of new weapons systems and the 
expansion of an increasingly capable and diverse U.S. Air Force inventory. American 
involvement in both Korean and Vietnam wars had increased military funding to 
previously unseen levels, and would secure a place for airpower in all future diplomatic 
and military endeavors. As such, aircraft procurement numbers jumped significantly from 
1950 onward, from 1,200 aircraft in FY1950 to over 8,500 in FY1951.290 
Though fighter and bomber aircraft remained the most visible elements of an air-
centric national military strategy, airlifters remained absolutely vital to support all future 
plans. Of these, the decades following the Berlin Airlift witnessed the development of 
increasingly larger and more capable transports. The age of nuclear brinksmanship relied 
heavily on the advancement of a large fleet of intercontinental bombers, supported by a 
fleet of aerial refueling platforms, which could attack anywhere, anytime. If land-based 
missiles were destroyed, at least some of the bombers would make it through Soviet 
defenses to deliver their lethal cargo. As General Nathan Twining surmised, “airlift on 
the scale we visualize would make it possible to move logistic support with and as the 
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bombers move…Without this support the strategic bombing force is neither truly 
strategic nor potent.”291 Alongside fleets of Air Force bombers, a unified airlift structure 
continued to utilize USAF to provide the mobility and flexibility necessary for a 
worldwide fighting force. By the mid-1960s the Military Air Transport Service was 
transformed once again into the Military Airlift Command (MAC), offering enhanced 
flexibility and an even greater level of operational cohesion. No longer were tactical and 
strategic airlift concerns separated. 
Though Army, Navy and Marine units retained limited air transport resources 
(primarily small fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters), the Air Force’s new jet transports 
provided critical capacity needed for large troop movements and the rapid deployment of 
tanks, armored vehicles, and support personnel. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s a 
diverse cadre of turboprop and jet transports came into widespread use and would 
provide the foundation for future air transport groups. The C-124 and C-133 were key to 
the Strategic Air Command’s deployment strategy, and the C-130 proved a seminal 
airframe that would continue operations well into the 21st century. Both President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” and the “Flexible Response” framework that followed were 
predicated on the availability of high capacity airlift operations. Perhaps the greatest 
technological achievement of the era was the massive C-5 Galaxy, an enormous four 
engine jet airlifter capable of carrying over 200,000 lbs. of cargo more than 2,000 miles. 
Its front and rear-facing cargo doors enable simultaneous loading and offloading, and is 
                                                           
291 Futrell, 151. 
116 
 
 
capable of hauling even the largest infantry support equipment such as the M1-A1 
Abrams battle tank.  
Without a robust airlift capacity, the most recent U.S. wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq would not have been logistically feasible. In conjunction with sealift and land 
transportation, airlift serves as the third leg of a “mobility triad” enabling U.S. forces to 
move anywhere in the globe with remarkable speed. In theaters where roadside bombs 
and guerrilla forces made ground transportation treacherous, aerial resupply provided a 
vital lifeline for all ground operations throughout southwest Asia. The U.S. military 
created a centralized command and logistics framework centered on massive air bases 
such as Bagram, Balad, and Al Asad. These bases were a point of origin for a vast 
majority of incoming ground troops, equipment, and materiel entering the theater of 
operations. As soldiers, airmen and marines manned far-flung outposts throughout the 
mountainous tribal regions of Afghanistan, air supply drops were the only feasible way 
they could receive the equipment, ammunition and supplies necessary to continue 
fighting. Without airpower, the mission was untenable. 
The design “DNA” of postwar air transports found their roots in the lessons of 
Burma and Berlin. Large payload capacities, ease of operation and maintenance, 
increasingly long range and the ability to land and take off from limited or unprepared 
runways are essential components of a modern air transport fleet. These elements, vital in 
wartime, are also key when administering diplomatic and humanitarian aid around the 
world. As a force in waiting, USAF was routinely called to assist in humanitarian aid 
situations, disaster relief, and any number of non-military situations “helping emerging 
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nations meet the needs of their citizens, and in feeding the hungry anywhere in the 
world.”292 To this end, emerging technologies such as digital datalinks, global positioning 
systems, and multifunction “glass” cockpits enable airlifter crews to undertake longer and 
more complicated missions with fewer crew members involved. Increased engine power 
and efficiency, as well as the advent of aerial refueling, allow USAF crews to haul 
heavier loads while using less fuel than previous platforms. 
With worldwide defense budgets continually fluctuating, it is clear that the 
development and support of a frontline airlifter force is one of the singularly important 
facets of any future Pentagon funding bill. Despite budget challenges and sequestration, 
both the continued procurement of C-17 aircraft, and the enhancement and modification 
of the C-5B fleet to C-5M standards were exempt from significant budget cuts. Although 
the C-27 Spartan twin-engine transport was shelved by the Air Force (only to be picked 
up by the U.S. Army for special operations purposes), the four-engine C-130 family of 
aircraft continues to expand into the most recent “J” model offering a longer fuselage, 
increased carrying capacity, and a modern suite of electronic navigation, global 
positioning and communications equipment. Following similar designs in the fighter and 
bomber fleets, various defense firms have begun preliminary testing of pilotless transport 
aircraft capable of operating autonomously. As increased use of remotely operated or 
autonomous aircraft spreads, the flexibility and capability of the American airlifter force 
will grow. Regardless of the direction future military strategies and technologies may 
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head, U.S. air mobility, born in the skies of Burma and Berlin, will continue to flourish 
across the country and around the world. 
  
119 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Unpublished Sources 
Adjutant General’s Office, War Department, to the Commanding Generals, all
 Armies GHQ Air Force Departments and Corps Areas et al., Letter, 
   “Constitution of the Air Corps Ferrying Command,” June 5, 1941. Air  
      Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
Airlift Task Force (Provisional), “Minutes of Operational Staff Meeting August 6, 
  1948.” Notes on Operational Staff Meeting August 20, 1948. Air Force  
 Historical Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
 Berlin Airlift Task Force, Interim Report 30 June 1948 to 30 July 1948,  
  Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
Berlin Airlift Task Force Headquarters, “Traffic Rules and Procedures for 
  Operations (sic) Vittles,” July 27, 1948. Air Force Historical Research 
  Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO) and HQ USAFE, “Letter Directive for a  
 Combined USAF-RAF Airlift Task Force,” to Major General USAF (no 
   date). Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
Chief of Staff, AF to USAFE, June 28, 1948. Message USAFE number 12936, in 
  June 1948 Cable File. Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm  
 reel #C5055.  
Combined Airlift Task Force, “Preliminary Analysis of Lessons Learned,” June 
  1949. Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
Daily Log of Operation Vittles July 14, 1948. Air Force Historical Research 
  Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
General John Cannon, HQ USAFE to Commanding General, Combined Airlift  
  Task Force General William Tunner, “Deactivation of Headquarters,  
  Combined Airlift Task Force,” August 12, 1949. Air Force Historical  
  Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
General Orders Number 104, HQ USAFE, November 26, 1948. 
  Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
120 
 
 
Headquarters, Combined Airlift Task Force, “History of the Operations Division 
  for 1 – 31 January 1949,” March 2, 1949. Air Force Historical Research 
  Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
Office of the Military Government United States (OMGUS), “Daily Summary  
  Number 1,” April 5, 1948. Air Force Historical Research Agency,  
  microfilm #C5055. 
Sprague, William interviewed by First Lieutenant L.E. Stockton, USAF, Tegel  
  Airfield February 16, 1949. Air Force Historical Research Agency,  
  microfilm #C5055. 
Tunner, General William H., “Letter Directive for a Combined USAF-RAF Airlift 
 Task Force,” no date. Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm 
  #C5055. 
Tunner, Lt. Gen William H. Interview by James Hasdorff, 5-6 November 1974, 
  transcript United States Air Force Oral History Program, Air Force  
 Historical Research Agency, microfilm #34909. 
 
United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS]  
 Diplomatic Papers, China. Washington, DC, 1942. University of  
 Wisconsin Digital Collections.   
 http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS (accessed July 23, 2014). 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Paper 1151/3, “European Air Transport  
 in the Transitional Period,” February 21, 1945. Air Force Historical 
 Research Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
“USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1948: Supply and Operational Aspects.” HQ 
 USAFE History Office, April 1, 1949. Air Force Historical Research 
  Agency, microfilm reel #C5055. 
“USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1949: Supply and Operational Aspects,” HQ 
  USAFE, April 1, 1950. Air Force Historical Research Agency, microfilm 
  reel #C5055. 
Published 
Aviation Operations Magazine, A Special Study of Operation Vittles. New York: 
  Conover Mast Publications, 1949. 
 
Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-30 September 1949 Ramstein 
   AB, Germany; HQ USAFE, n.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 
    microfilm reel #C5055. 
 
121 
 
 
Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. New York: Doubleday, 1950. 
Historical Division, United States Air Force, Orgnization of the Army Air Arm 
   1935-1945. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: United States Air Force, 1956. 
History Office, United States Air Force, A History of the United States Air Force 
  1907-1957 ed. Alfred Goldberg. New York: D. Von Nostrand Co., 1957. 
Task Force Times (Wiesbaden, Germany), October 1, 1948. Air Force Historical 
  Research Agency, microfilm #C5055. 
Tunner, William H. Over the Hump 2nd ed. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
   1964. 
 
USAAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division, 
  “Administrative History, Ferrying Command, 29 May 1941-30 June 1942. 
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090602-073.pdf 
(accessed July 23, 2014). 
 
USAAF, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces, Army Air Forces 
   Statistical Digest (WWII), 1945. 
    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf  
   (accessed July 23, 2014). 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Bowers, Peter M. Boeing Aircraft Since 1916. 3rd ed. London: Putnam 
  Aeronautical Books, 1989. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, “Effect of Soviet Restrictions on the US Position in 
  Berlin,” Washington, DC, June 14, 1948. 
 
Coffey, Thomas. Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay New 
  York: Crown Publishers, 1986. 
 
Collier, Richard. Bridge Across the Sky: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift 1948- 
 1949. New York: McGraw Hill, 1978. 
 
Craven, Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate. 7 Vols. The Army Air Forces in 
  World War II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-1959. 
 
Davis, Jeffrey. “ATFERO: The Atlantic Ferry Organization,” Journal of 
  Contemporary History 20 (Jan 1985), 71-97. 
 
122 
 
 
Davis, John M., Harold G. Martin and John A. Whittle. The Curtiss C-46 
  Commando. Essex, England: Air-Britain, 1978. 
 
Foulois, Benjamin D. and Carroll V. Glines. From the Wright Brothers to the 
  Astronauts: The Memoirs of Major General Benjamin Foulois. New York: 
  McGraw-Hill, 1968. 
 
Francillon, Rene J. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920: Volume I 
  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 
 
Futrell, Robert Frank. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in 
  the United States Air Force 1907-1964. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air 
  University, 1974. 
 
George, Harold Lee. “The Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces,” Annals of 
  the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol 230 (Nov. 
  1943), 89-92. 
 
Glines, Carroll V. and Wendell F. Mosely The Legendary DC-3. New York: Van 
  Nostrand Reinhold Co, 1979. 
 
Haulman, Daniel L. The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift 
  Operations 1947-1994. Washington DC: Air Force Historical Research 
  Agency, 1998. 
 
Hogan, Michael J. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the 
  National Security State 1945-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1998. 
 
Hitchcock, William I. The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a 
  Divided Continent, 1945 to Present. New York: Anchor Books, 2003. 
 
Knack, Marcelle Size. Military Airlift and Aircraft Procurement: The Case of the 
  C-5A. Washington, DC: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1998. 
 
Koenig, William. Over the Hump: Airlift to China. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 
 
La Farge, Oliver. The Eagle in the Egg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949. 
 
Launius, Roger D. and Coy F. Cross II MAC and the Legacy of the Berlin Airlift. 
  Scott AFB, Illinois: Military Airlift Command, 1989. 
 
Lloyd, Alwyn T. A Cold War Legacy: A Tribute to Strategic Air Command – 
  1946-1992. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., 1999. 
 
123 
 
 
Maurer Mauer. Aviation in the U.S. Army 1919-1939. Washington DC: Office of 
  Air Force History, 1987. 
 
Miller, Charles E. Airlift Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 
  1988. 
 
Miller, Roger G. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. College Station: 
  Texas A&M University Press, 2000. 
 
Moody, Walton S. Building a Strategic Air Force. Washington, D.C.: Air Force 
  History and Museums Program, 1996. 
 
Parker, R.A.C. The Second World War: A Short History. Oxford: Oxford 
  University Press, 1989. 
 
Parrish, Thomas. Berlin in the Balance: The Blockade, The Airlift, The First 
  Major Battle of the Cold War Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1998. 
 
Paterson, Thomas G. On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold 
  War. Rev. ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1992. 
 
Patrick, Mason M. The United States in the Air. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
 Doran and Co., 1928. 
 
Pearcy, Arthur. Douglas Propliners: DC-1 to DC-7. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife 
  Publishing 1995. 
 
Plating, John D. The Hump: America’s Strategy for Keeping China in World War 
  II. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2011. 
 
Shlaim, Avi. The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in 
  Crisis Decisionmaking. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
 
Slayton, Robert A. Master of the Air: William Tunner and the Success of Military 
  Airlift Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2010. 
 
Tusa, Ann and John. The Berlin Airlift. New York: Sarpedon, 1998. 
 
Werrell, Kenneth P. “The Dark Ages of Strategic Airlift: The Propeller Era.” Air 
  Power History (Fall 2003), 20-33. 
 
Wolk, Herman S. Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947. 
   Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984. 
 
124 
 
 
Yenne. Bill. Hap Arnold: The General Who Invented the U.S. Air Force. New 
 York: Regnery 2013. 
